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The Cover: The Immortals

by William Pinckard

The Sino-Japanese character for 'sage' or 'immortal' is composed of two elements which signify 'mountain person.' The word was applied to someone who was not only wise but ageless, someone in possession of supernatural powers and able to wander through heaven and earth at will.

In China and Japan mountains were regarded as realms of mystery. Uncanny things happen on mountain tops, and a person who spent years among the peaks, remote from the dust of everyday concerns, was believed to acquire a type of knowledge beyond the ken of ordinary folk. The progenitors of such awe-inspiring figures are no doubt to be found in the shamans and diviners of early China. Their activities were intimately bound up with the birth of Taoist philosophy and thus with the development of go itself.

An interesting example of the accretion of supernatural ideas around the go board is given by Liu Tsung-yuen, writing in 815, describing a certain mountain near the capitol of Kuei-chou in South China:

Below the shallows of the north-flowing Hsun water, and then west, is the so-called Mountain of the Transcendents' Go Game. This mountain can be ascended from the west. There is a cavern at its top, and this cavern has screens, chambers, and eaves. Under these eaves there are figures formed from flowing stone . . . [After ascending to the topmost cavern] go out through this to the north and you will be looking down on a great wilderness, and on flying birds — all you will discern of them is their backs. The first person to ascend here obtained a stone game board on the summit, with red veins on a black surface, making eighteen pathways, suitable for go. This is why it is so named.

There are many legends about people who by chance encounter an immortal. An old

Chinese story, which made a deep impression on the Japanese mind, tells of a certain Wang Chih, a woodcutter:

Wang Chih was a hardy young fellow who used to venture deep into the mountains to find suitable wood for his axe. One day he went farther than usual and became lost. He wandered about for a while and eventually came upon two strange old men who were playing go, their board resting on a rock between them. Wang Chih was fascinated. He put down his axe and began to watch. One of the players gave him something like a date to chew on, so that he felt neither hunger nor thirst. As he continued to watch he fell into a sort of trance for what seemed like an hour or two. When he awoke, however, the two old men were no longer there. He found that his axe handle had rotted to dust and he had grown a long beard. When he got back to his native village he discovered that his family had disappeared and that no one even remembered his name.

The Japanese poet and court official Ki no Tomonori poignantly alludes to this legend in a nostalgic poem composed around the year 900, upon his return to the capital from service in a distant province:

*I've come back home.
There is no friend to play go with.
That place far away
where an axe handle turned to dust —
how dear to me it has become!*

And another eight centuries later the playwright Chikamatsu made use of the same legend in a memorable scene in his play *The Battles of Coxinga*

Go was one of the standard pictorial themes in the ink paintings of the Kano school in Japan. This school flourished from the 16th

to the mid-19th century and had a repertoire of subjects adapted from Chinese models, one of them being two or three old gentlemen playing go, often shown using a flat, smooth rock for a board. Not every painting on this theme depicts immortals: some merely show it as a pastime of poets and scholars. But the scene is usually laid on a mountain top or in a lonely forest, as if the artist thereby meant to reaffirm a traditional association of go with unwordly matters.

During the Edo period in Japan (1615–1868) gods and Buddhas were frequently depicted in art with light-hearted irreverence. The most popular of them were the genial 'Seven Gods of Good Fortune', a collection of divinities, originally from different parts of Asia, who between them seem to offer mankind the promise of every sort of material prosperity. In prints and paintings they may be shown all together, in smaller groups, or singly. Sometimes two of them are playing go while a third looks on. These are usually the gods of prosperity and long life, Daikoku, Fukurokuju and Ebisu — Indian (Buddhist), Chinese (Taoist) and Japanese (Shinto) in origin, respectively. The grouping of these three in particular is analogous to the popular subject known as 'The Three Wine (or Vinegar) Tasters', where Confucius, the Taoist sage known as Lao Tzu, and the Buddha or a Bodhisattva are shown standing around and laughing as they taste from a huge pot. The meaning is that the essential truths of their doctrines are the same, though the flavor may be adapted to the needs of different people.

These three naturalized Japanese gods, Daikoku, Fukurokuju and Ebisu, surely belong to the class of immortals. And since they are

always depicted as having a fine time together, go would seem to be the right game for them to play. In prints on this subject the intention may be to show that the appeal of the game is universal — like the love of wine.

There is also a story on this theme of Bodhidharma, the patriarch of the Zen sect of Buddhism. Bodhidharma is making a tour of India when he comes across two strange and rather dirty old monks in a monastery who have done nothing for years but play go, thus earning the contempt of their fellows. As the patriarch watches them play, he sees that they keep vanishing and reappearing, which to him is a sign that they have reached enlightenment. At the end of their game they explain why they devote themselves exclusively to go.

'We consider that whenever black wins, the passions wax within our bodies, and when white wins, bodhi [understanding] grows within our hearts, and that the white of bodhi subdues the black of passion. We use the occasion to contemplate impermanence.'

The earliest version of this most interesting story appears in the Chinese collection *Fa-yuan chu-lin*, compiled in 668. The explanation of the monks actually makes good sense if one thinks of it in connection with what Zen Master Dogen preached. The players are not opponents so much as partners playing on the same side, freed of ego, and watching dispassionately the outcome of each game.

The cover is an ink on paper drawing showing three sages about to start a go game under a cliff.

From the Ishi Press collection.

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Go World News

International News: 1992

Ma Wins 5th Japan-China Meijin Playoff Kobayashi Suffers First Loss

Ma Xiaochun 9-dan of China has achieved his most cherished ambition: to defeat Kobayashi Koichi in the annual Japan-China Meijin playoff.

Ma started well by winning the first game, played in Tokyo on 15 December 1992, by 1½ points, thus spoiling Kobayashi's perfect record in these playoffs. Kobayashi evened the series by forcing Ma to resign in the second game (17 December). However, Ma triumphed in the third game (18 December) with another 1½-point win.

Following upon Nie's win in the 5th Japan-China Tengen playoff, China's first win ever in a title playoff, this success completed a good double for China.

Ma had defended the 5th Mingren (= Meijin) title by defeating the winner of the league, Zhang Wendong 8-dan, 3-1. The final game of the match was played on 26 October.



Success at last for Ma: after three years without winning a game, he finally managed to pull off a victory against his nemesis.

International News: 1993

A Year of Triumph for Korea

Korean players have dominated the international scene so far in 1993, having won all four of the major international tournaments staged this year, with a minor tournament thrown in. These successes are sure to stimulate even further the boom in the popularity of go caused by the emergence of the prodigy Lee Chang-ho (it's claimed that one in five Koreans play go). The details of these tournament wins are given below.

Cho Hun-hyun Wins Jinro-SBS

The full name of this tournament is the 1st Jinro Cup: The SBS World Championship. This tournament was known as the SBS Cup: The World's Strongest Player when it was founded in 1991 to commemorate the launching of a new TV channel, SBS, in Seoul. The format is unique: a three-way knockout competition among teams from Japan, Korea and China, with each player meeting opponents in turn from the other two countries until he is defeated. The 1st Cup was won by Korea, with Seo Bong-soo defeating Rin Kaiho (playing for Japan) and Nie Weiping in the last two games. The services of the number one Korean player, Cho Hun-hyun, were not called upon. (For a more detailed report, see GW66, page 3, and GW67, page 4.)

Last year the tournament acquired an extra sponsor, the rice-wine distiller Jinro, though the prize money remained unchanged at 100 million *won* (about ¥15,000,000, the same as last year's Fujitsu Cup). This prize goes to the winning team; in addition, each player receives a game fee of two million *won* (about ¥300,000).

The tournament is run in a *haya-go* format, with a time allowance of one hour per player, followed by one-minute *byo-yomi*. It began on 9 December 1992 and finished on 26 February 1993, with all games being played in Seoul.

The full results are given below:

Miyazawa Goro 9-dan (Japan) beat Shao Weigang 5-dan (China), then lost to Yoo Chang-hyeok 5-dan (Korea). Yoo then beat Yu Bin 9-dan (China), but lost to Yoda Norimoto 8-dan (Japan). Yoda then lost to Cao Dayuan 9-dan (China), who continued by beating Chang Soo-yong 9-dan (Korea) and Awaji Shuzo 9-dan (Japan) before losing to Lee Chang-ho 6-dan (Korea). Lee lost to Rin Kaiho (Japan), who also beat Liu Xiaoguang 9-dan (China) before losing to Seo Bong-soo 9-dan (Korea). Seo defeated Ma Xiaochun 9-dan (China), eliminating China, before losing to Takemiya Masaki (Japan). Cho Hun-hyun then defeated Takemiya in the final game to win the tournament for Korea. (This game is given on page 38.)

This was a bad tournament for China: except for Cao, who had the best results of any player with three wins, no Chinese player won a game.

Lee Chang-ho Wins 4th Tong Yang Cup

Lee Chang-ho scored his first significant international success when he defeated Rin Kaiho 3-2 in the 3rd Cup in January last year. This year he showed that that was no

fluke by beating Cho Chikun and winning the cup for the second year in a row. Moreover, his winning margin was three wins to no losses. Lee was still only 17 (he turned 18 on 29 July 1993) when he became a world champion for the second time.

Details of the first two rounds were given in GW68 (page 4). Results from the quarter-finals on were:

Quarterfinals (4 November 1992). Nie beat Rin, Cho Chikun (playing for Korea) beat Kim Soo-jang 8-dan (Korea), Cho Hun-hyun (Korea) beat Ma (China), and Lee (Korea) beat Yoo (Korea).

Semifinals (9, 11 February 1993). Cho Chikun beat Nie 2-0, Lee beat Cho Hun-hyun 2-0.

Final. Game 1 (22 April 1993): Lee (W) won by resignation. Game 2 (24 April): Lee (B) won by $\frac{1}{2}$ point. Game 3 (8 June): Lee (W) won by $\frac{1}{2}$ point.

As the two half-point wins might suggest, one of Lee's strongest weapons is his outstanding endgame precision. In both of these games, Cho was ahead for much of the time but saw his lead upset in the endgame. Incidentally, this was the first time ever that Cho played a younger opponent in a title match.



Lee (left) defeats Cho Chikun in the final of the Tong Yang Cup.



Seo Bong-soo

Seo Wins 2nd Ing Cup

In another triumph for Korea, Seo Bong-soo 9-dan has won the 2nd Ing Cup, with its mammoth first prize of \$400,000, by defeating Otake 9-dan of Japan 3-2 in the final. Since Cho Hun-hyun won the 1st Ing Cup, that means Korea has monopolized this title. Seo will remain the Ing World Champion for the next four years.

We plan to give the games from the final in our next issue. The best-of-three semifinal between Otake and Rui Naiwei is presented in this issue. Full results in the final were:

Game 1 (9 March), Otake (W) won by 6½.

Game 2 (11 March). Seo (W) won by 4½.

Game 3 (16 May). Seo (B) won by resig.

Game 4 (18 May). Otake (B) won by 8½.

Game 5 (20 May). Seo (B) won by resig.

The first two games were played in Korea and the next three in Singapore.

6th Fujitsu Cup: An All-Korean Final

The Fujitsu Cup saw the fourth signal success for Korea this year. The tournament had seemed to be shaping up as a Japanese triumph, with five Japanese players making it to the quarterfinals with two Koreans and one Chinese, but the two Koreans were the ones to go through to the final, with two Japanese players being left to fight it out for

3rd and 4th place.

In the final, played on 7 August, Yoo Chang-hyeok of Korea beat his fellow countryman Cho Hun-hyun by 6½ points to win his first Fujitsu Cup. The playoff between Kato and Awaji for third place was won by Kato. This is the first time that the Nihon Ki-in monopoly of the Fujitsu Cup has been broken.



Yang Hui makes a splash on her debut in the Fujitsu Cup.

As usual, the opening two rounds had their share of upsets and victories by dark horses. The highlight of the first round was a win by a Chinese woman player, the first woman to play in the Fujitsu Cup, over a former Fujitsu champion. Yang Hui 8-dan edged out Takemiya Masaki by half a point and showed the world that Rui Naiwei is not the only strong woman player from China. In the second round, however, she found Korea's Cho Hun-hyun a tougher nut to crack.

Yang's victory was the only bright spot in the tournament for the Chinese, who have been having a bad time in the international arena this year. The player who survived to the quarterfinals was Shao Weigang, a newcomer to the international scene, while the Chinese big guns all lost in the second round (see results below). That was ironic, because that round was scheduled to be held in

Beijing, and there was almost no one left for Chinese fans to cheer for.

Other results of interest from the first round:

Round One. Cho Chikun (Japan) beat Michael Redmond (USA), Seo Bong-soo (Korea) beat Alexei Lazarev (Europe), Yoo (Korea) beat Ishida Yoshio (Japan), Awaji beat Zhang Wendong (China), Yang Jaeho (Korea) beat Rin Kaiho (Japan).

Full results from Round Two on:

Round Two. Kato Masao (Japan) beat Liu Xiaoguang (China), Shao (China) beat Yang (Korea), Kobayashi Koichi (Japan) beat Seo (Korea), Cho Hun-hyun (Korea) beat Yang (China), Otake (Japan) beat Lin (Chinese Taipei), Yoo (Korea) beat O Rissei (Japan), Cho Chikun beat Nie Weiping (China), Awaji beat Ma Xiaochun (China).

Quarterfinals. Kato beat Shao, Cho Hun-hyun beat Kobayashi, Yoo beat Otake, Awaji beat Cho Chikun.

Semifinals. Cho beat Kato, Yoo beat Awaji.

Both semifinal games were decided by half a point, and both were upset victories. Kato, in particular, was very upset by the way he messed up what should have been an easy win.

This year the prize money was increased to 20 million yen (about \$190,000), so the Fujitsu Cup regained sole place as the second-richest international tournament.

Incidentally, the reader may have noticed the absence of Lee Chang-ho from the names listed above. This year Lee decided to pass up on the Fujitsu Cup, presumably because he was too busy with title matches in Korea. (As of April, when the Fujitsu Cup started, Lee held nine of the 14 Korean titles. His teacher, Cho Hun-hyun, was left with three, and Seo and Yoo had one each.)

Korea Wins 2nd IBM Cup

This tournament is not to be confused with the IBM Lightning Open Tournament, staged from 1988 to 1990. The IBM Cup is a

Japan-Korea match between three-man teams using computer communications. The 1st Cup was held last year and resulted in a 3-0 win for Korea. This year the Japanese team improved on that result, but only by a little, going down 2-1. On the top board, Otake failed to secure revenge on Seo for his Ing loss. Komatsu Hideki 8-dan won against Kim Soo-jang 9-dan, and Michael Redmond (who also played on last year's team) lost to Kang Hoon 7-dan.

This match may be a minor affair compared to the large-scale international tournaments, but Korea's victory does give it a clean sweep of all five international tournaments it participated in during 1993.

Japan Wins 7th Super Go

The only bright spot for Japan this year has been the victory of its team in the 7th Japan-China Super Go series.

To continue from our previous report in GW68: at that stage Yoda had put Japan ahead 4-1 by winning two games in a row, but he lost his next game, to Yu Bin 9-dan. Kobayashi Satoru then defeated Yu Bin, but lost to Ma Xiaochun.

Ma now looked dangerous as he went on to defeat Yamashiro Hiroshi and Kataoka Satoshi and so even the score. However, he just gave Awaji Shuzo a chance to shine. The latter defeated both Ma (on 18 March) and Nie (on 10 May) to wrap up the series for Japan. Nie's recent run of reverses in international competition have somewhat dented his formidable reputation as the 'iron goal-keeper', but the Chinese have not yet come up with someone to take his place.

Awaji's win meant that the team captain, Otake Hideo, did not have to play. The final score was 7-5.

Japan's Superb Start in 8th Super Go

The Japanese are celebrating their victory in the 7th Super Go by romping to a big lead in the 8th. The first player on the Japanese team, Kato Atsushi, an 18-year-old 4-dan, has shocked the Chinese by rolling over the first four players on their team. In the first two games, played in Beijing on 31 May and 2 June, he beat Zhou Heyang 4-dan and Shao Weigang 5-dan. That was no mean



Awaji wins the 7th Super Go series for Japan by defeating Nie Weiping by half a point.

achievement, as these two took 3rd and 1st places respectively in the Chinese National Championship last year, but Kato bettered it by defeating Wang Jianhong 8-dan and Zhang Wendong 9-dan (the games were played in Tokyo on 20 and 22 July).

China has just three players left: Chen Linxin, Ma and Nie. This seems like a perfect chance for Japan to catch up with China and even the tally of series won at 4-4.

China Wins Japan-China Tengen Playoff

China won its third title playoff in a row when Liu Xiaoguang 9-dan defeated Rin Kaiho 2-0 in the 6th Japan-China Tengen playoff. Liu won the first game (17 June 1993) by 10½ points and the second (19 June) by 1½ points. This was a very satisfying victory for Liu, as he had lost three playoffs in a row from 1988 to 1990. After twice losing 0-2 to Cho Chikun (1988, 1989), Liu picked up his first win in 1990, though he lost the match 1-2 to Rin, but then he lost the Chinese Tianyuan title to Nie. The latter also lost 1-2 to Rin in his first playoff in 1991, but the following year he scored China's first victory with a 2-1 win over Rin.

Liu went into a slump when he lost the Tianyuan title to Nie, but this year he was back in top form and recaptured his title from Nie with a 3-1 score (the final game was played on 11 March).

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
Kobayashi Defends 17th Meijin Title Earns Title of Honorary Meijin

The 1992 Meijin title match followed a seesaw pattern, with the players alternating wins. In fact, the same colour, black, won all of the first six games, the only time this has ever happened in the Meijin title. In the final game, the challenger had black and came within an ace of taking the title. Otake was leading by half a point going into the late endgame when Kobayashi found a brilliancy that upset his lead. White 1 in the diagram on page 8 is the only way for White to win. The outcome of a two-month struggle was decided by one endgame move.

This was one of the hardest-fought title matches of recent years. Actually it was the first time for seven years that the title match went to seven games. For Otake, losing so close to victory was very painful. He has

won four Meijin titles, but the last was in 1979.

By winning the title for the fifth year in a row, Kobayashi became the second player (the first was Cho Chikun) to earn the title of Honorary Meijin. He doesn't actually get to use the honorary title until he's 60 or retired, but thanks to it he qualifies for a bonus from the sponsor, the Asahi newspaper, after he loses the title.



The results:

Game 1 (9, 10 Sept.). Kobayashi (B) by resig.
 Game 2 (24, 25 Sept.). Otake (B) by $\frac{1}{2}$ point.
 Game 3 (30 Sept., 1 Oct.). Kobayashi (B) by $1\frac{1}{2}$ points.
 Game 4 (14, 15 Oct.). Otake (B) by resig.
 Game 5 (21, 22 Oct.). Kobayashi (B) by resig.
 Game 6 (4, 5 Nov.). Otake (B) by $3\frac{1}{2}$ points.
 Game 7 (11, 12 Nov.). Kobayashi (W) by $\frac{1}{2}$ point.

Shuko Wins 40th Oza, Extends Record as Oldest Title Holder

The 40th Oza title match witnessed an exciting clash between a great veteran player and Japan's number one, Kobayashi Koichi. The challenger started with the first win, but Fujisawa Shuko made a comeback with a very strong win in the second game, in which he completely outplayed Kobayashi.

The third game featured three spectacular *furikawari* (trades), and was won by Shuko by half a point. Kobayashi couldn't believe it (Shuko also looked doubtful), so

the game recorder replayed the game to confirm the score.

Kobayashi evened the score again in the next game, so the climax came in the 5th game. Here Shuko displayed some of the brilliant form that formerly earned him six Kisei titles. The 67-year-old champion won the game and so set a new record for the oldest player to hold a title.

The results:

Game 1 (6 Oct.). Kobayashi (W) by $2\frac{1}{2}$.
 Game 2 (19 Oct.). Fujisawa (W) by resig.
 Game 3 (28 Oct.). Fujisawa (B) by $\frac{1}{2}$ point.
 Game 4 (16 Nov.). Kobayashi (B) by resig.
 Game 5 (25 Nov.). Fujisawa (B) by $5\frac{1}{2}$ points.

Rin Rebuffs Yamashiro's Tengen Challenge, Kobayashi Misses Chance for Unique Record

In the playoff to decide the challenger for the 18th Tengen title, held on 8 October, Yamashiro Hiroshi took some revenge for his loss in the Kisei title match at the beginning of the year by defeating Kobayashi Koichi in 167 moves. This stopped Kobayashi from setting a unique record: becoming the first player ever to play in all seven title matches during one year. Kobayashi did not look overly disappointed when he lost: a win would have meant setting another record by becoming the first player to be engaged in three title matches simultaneously (he was already playing in the Meijin and Oza title matches). Even for someone as fit as Kobayashi, this might have been too much of a burden. As it was, he was reported to be saving all his energy for his Meijin-title games and playing very quickly in other games to avoid getting tired.

Yamashiro was not able to make much of an impression on Rin in the title match, winning only one game. Rin has now held the Tengen title for four years in a row.

The results:

Game 1 (9 Nov.). Rin (B) won by resig.
 Game 2 (19 Nov.). Yamashiro (B) by $5\frac{1}{2}$.
 Game 3 (30 Nov.). Rin (B) by $7\frac{1}{2}$.
 Game 4 (9 Dec.). Rin (W) by $3\frac{1}{2}$.

Cho Wins TV Haya-go Championship

In the final of the 25th Haya-go (fast go) Championship, telecast in November, Cho Chikun defeated O Rissei and became the first player to win this title for three years in a row. First prize is worth ¥3,900,000 and second prize ¥780,000.

The pairing was the same as in the NHK Cup, also won by Cho. O Rissei came second in three tournaments in 1992 (the other was the Fujitsu Cup); that may prove that he was enjoying good form, but it must have been very frustrating.



*Kato Tomoko, the second
1-dan to win a women's title*

New Face Wins Women's Honinbo

The 11th Women's Honinbo Title was won by a player who had been a professional for only one and a half years. Kato Tomoko 1-dan defeated Nakazawa Ayako 3-dan 2-0 in the title match. Kato is two years older than Nakazawa, who turned 21 just before the title match, but she did not become a professional until the spring of 1991. Nakazawa was also 1-dan when she first won this title, in 1990.

News from Japan: 1993

Kobayashi Defends Kisei Title

In the 17th Kisei title match Kato Masao made his fourth challenge for the title. He had defeated Tono Hiroaki 9-dan of the Kansai Ki-in 2-0 in the playoff at the end of 1992. Previously Kato had lost to Fujisawa Shuko (2nd Kisei, 1978) and twice to Kobayashi (12th, 1988; 15th, 1991). Kato claimed to be in even better form than when he challenged in 1991 and was narrowly defeated 4-3. Since Kato was riding a remarkable winning streak and hadn't lost a game since early September, Kobayashi seemed in considerable danger of losing his title. Kato had the further incentive that winning the Kisei would complete a grand slam of the seven top titles.

Kato made an excellent start to the title match, with an easy win in the first game, played in Hong Kong, and an upset win in the second. It looked as if Kobayashi was about to lose his place at the top of the go world, but he fought back to take the third game, thus putting an end to Kato's streak at 22 wins in a row.

Disaster again loomed for the title holder after an unusual loss in the fourth game. Convinced that he had a half-point win, Kobayashi ceded a half-point ko towards the end to Kato without fighting it and was mortified to find that he was the one to lose by half a point. He was even more upset when a spectator pointed out later that even after ceding the ko there was a *tesuji* that would have gained him a point.

Ahead 3-1, Kato seemed to have the Kisei title firmly within his grasp, but now things started going wrong for him. After Kobayashi scored a good win in the fifth game, Kato built a winning position in the sixth only to go to pieces in the endgame. He let slip chance after chance of clinching a win and ended up behind by half a point. He didn't play well in the final game, and so, against all the odds, Kobayashi defended his title with three straight wins. It must have been a nice change for him to be on the winning side of an upset after his bitter experiences against Cho Chikun recently.

Kato's failure to clinch the title in the sixth game is inexplicable in go terms, but perhaps fatigue is the answer. Kato loses his appetite completely during a game and eats almost nothing, so it would not have been surprising if his stamina gave out late on the second day. He himself, of course, did not make any excuses.

For the second year in a row, Kobayashi came from behind to defend the Kisei title. Every year it's getting harder, but in the meantime he has extended his tally to eight. Next target: drawing even with Takagawa's record, which has stood since 1960, of nine terms in a row in a top title.

The results:

Game 1 (13, 14 Jan.). Kato (B) won by resig.
 Game 2 (27, 28 Jan.). Kato (W) won by 2½.
 Game 3 (3, 4 Feb.). Kobayashi (W) won by 1½.
 Game 4 (17, 18 Feb.). Kobayashi (B) won by ½.
 Game 5 (24, 25 Feb.). Kato (B) won by resig.
 Game 6 (10, 11 March). Kobayashi (B) won by ½.
 Game 7 (17, 18 March). Kobayashi (B) won by resig.

Kato's String of Second Places

His Kisei loss was not the only setback Kato suffered this year. Between the second and third games of the Kisei title, he lost the 40th NHK Cup to Yoda Norimoto. Then, between the sixth and seventh games, he also lost the final of the 12th NEC Cup to the same opponent (by half a point). His first game after the Kisei title match ended was the final of the 15th Kakusei Cup; again he lost, this time to O Rissei. In less than two months, Kato has scored four second places, which must be some kind of a record. These losses were also painful financially: the NHK Cup is worth ¥4,000,000 to the winner as against only ¥800,000 to the loser, the Kakusei prize is ¥4,500,000 (loser ¥1,500,000), and the NEC Cup is worth more than the Judan and Gosei titles, with a first prize of ¥10,000,000 (second prize ¥2,000,000). This string of second places reminds one of the eight second places in a row scored by Kato before he made his title breakthrough. He can only hope that he is

not doomed to break *that* record.

Otake's Comeback in the Judan Title

Otake Hideo 9-dan has made a comeback in the Judan title, winning the 31st title match 3-1 and ending Takemiya's three-year reign. Otake unsuccessfully challenged Kobayashi Koichi for this title in 1985 and last held it in 1980-81. It is his third Judan title and 41st title overall (still a distant second place to Sakata's record of 64 but keeping his edge over Cho Chikun's 38).

To become the challenger, Otake first beat Cho Chikun in the final game in the winners' section, played in November 1992. He then had to wait over two months for the losers' section to be completed. Here the star was Ogata Masaki 8-dan, aged 28 and one of the top players of the Nagoya branch of the Nihon Ki-in. Ogata beat Yamashiro and Yoda, both by half a point, to win the losers' section, but in the playoff, held on 4 February, Otake squashed his hopes of making his first title challenge.

Results of the title match:

Game 1 (4 March, played in Bangkok). Otake (W) won by 9½ points.
 Game 2 (17 March). Takemiya (W) by 2½.
 Game 3 (1 April). Otake (W) by 2½.
 Game 4 (15 April). Otake (B) by 11½.

Cho Chikun Defends Honinbo, Earns Title of Honorary Honinbo

In the 48th Honinbo title match, Cho Chikun has rebuffed the challenge of Yamashiro Hiroshi and, by winning the title for the fifth year in a row, has become the fourth player (after Takagawa, Sakata, and Ishida) to secure the title of Honorary Honinbo. Cho has now won seven Honinbo titles overall, which puts him even with Sakata and one ahead of Takemiya.

Making his third Honinbo challenge, Yamashiro got off to a good start by winning the second game, and at this point we seemed to be in for another closely contested match like his Kisei challenge. However, the title holder then reeled off three wins in a row to wind up the match. The feeling among spectators was that Yamashiro's play lacked the tenacity and aggression he displayed against Kobayashi. Before the match,

he announced that he was going to 'play carefully', but this policy didn't seem to work. The result is that at the age of 35 and after six title challenges, Yamashiro still hasn't picked up his first title.

The results:

Game 1 (7, 8 May). Cho (B) won by 6½.

Game 2 (24, 25 May). Yamashiro (B) by 3½.

Game 3 (16, 17 June). Cho (B) by 2½.

Game 4 (24, 25 June). Cho (W) by 2½.

Game 5 (29, 30 June). Cho (B) by resig.

49th Honinbo League

As the chart for the 48th league on page 12 shows, some surprising players lost their places. After winning the league three years in a row, Kobayashi dropped to bottom place. Moreover, he lost his game in the first round of the final preliminary section, so he will have to sit out the league for a year. Otake Hideo also lost, in the third and final round of this section. His opponent was Takemiya, who thus makes a comeback after missing three leagues. Also making a comeback, after the same period of absence, is Fujisawa Shuko, whose continuing good form at the age of 68 (his birthday was on 14 June) makes him one of the wonders of the go world. These two are joined by O Rissei, playing in his second league, and Yuki Satoshi 7-dan, making his debut. The 21-year-old Yuki, on current form the top player at the Kansai Ki-in, finally made the breakthrough into the league after losing in the final round three years in a row.

Otake to Challenge Kobayashi Meijin

After leading the 18th Meijin league (see chart on page 12) all the way, Otake Hideo stumbled with a 8th-round loss to Cho Chikun. Even so, he was still one point clear of the field, so when he won his final-round game against Kataoka Satoshi he clinched the challengership. That gives Otake yet another crack — the third in four years — at taking the Meijin title from Kobayashi Koichi.

Late news. Game One, played on 1 and 2 September, was won by Kobayashi, playing white, by 1½ points.

Kobayashi Defeats Rin in 18th Gosei Title

Last year Kobayashi Satoru became the third player to challenge for the same title three years in a row. This year he came very close to making that four years in a row, but in the playoff to decide the challenger he lost to Rin Kaiho. Kobayashi came very close: he lost the game by just half a point, disappointing the large gallery that had assembled to see him set a new record. That gave him his first loss in the Gosei tournament (as distinct from the title match) in three years (he won 22 games in a row).

Rin was not able to improve on Kobayashi Satoru's performance, however. He lost three games straight to give Kobayashi Koichi his sixth Gosei title in a row.

The results:

Game 1 (8 July). Kobayashi (W) by 4½.

Game 2 (22 July). Kobayashi (B) by resig.

Game 3 (11 August). Kobayashi (W) by resig.

News from China

Two New 9-dans

At the All-China 1993 Rating Tournament, held from 10 to 24 June, 33 players out of the 204 participating earned promotions, including two to 9-dan. Reaching the top of the dan ladder were Chen Linxin and Zhang Wendong. Shao Weigang earned promotion to 6-dan and Liu Jing, aged 18 and tipped as a future star, to 5-dan.

Ma Wins 9x9 Go

At present, 9x9 go is enjoying popularity among Chinese professionals. On 4 June, the five-round 1st 9x9 Tournament was held and was won by Ma Xiaochun, with Chen Zude coming second.

News from Korea

Korea the World's Top Go-Playing Country?

Go is enjoying an extraordinary boom in popularity in Korea, spurred on by the outstanding success of Korea's top professionals in international tournaments recently. Korea

would be quite justified in claiming to be the world's top go-playing country in strength, on the basis of its monopoly of international titles this year, but there is also reason to believe that go has achieved greater popularity there than anywhere else.

When Cho Hun-hyun won the 1st Ing Cup in 1989, news of his victory monopolized the front pages of the newspapers and he received a police escort from the airport into Seoul. That success is perhaps what triggered the current boom. To go back a bit further, though, Cho Chikun's successful challenge for the Japanese Meijin title in 1980 was an important factor in giving go a higher profile in Korea (the game had image problems, because traditionally it had always been associated with gambling).

At present, it's claimed that Korea has a go population of eight million, which means that one person in five plays the game

(known as *paduk* there). The traditional figure for Japan is ten million people who know how to play go, but a survey on leisure activities carried out a few years ago revised this down to seven million. In contrast to Japan, where the decline in interest in go among young people has been conspicuous, this is where there has been the greatest growth in Korea. There are reported to be 1,000 go schools for children, with an enrolment of something like 100,000. Some have their own school buses and hold classes five days a week.

Professional go began in Korea as recently as the 1950s, and at present there are just over 100 professional players. Of these, four are current or past world champions. They are all products of the pre-boom days (except for Lee Chang-ho). What, then, can we expect in the future from Korean go?

48th Honinbo League

Title-holder: Cho Chikun

Rank	Name	KK	O	KM	C	R	I	KS	Y	Score	Place
1	Kobayashi K.	—	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	2-5	—
2	Otake	1	—	0	0	1	0	1	0	3-4	—
3	Komatsu H.	1	1	—	1	0	1	0	0	4-3	2
4	Chan Ka Yui	0	1	0	—	0	1	0	1	3-4	—
5	Rin Kaiho	1	0	1	1	—	0	0	1	4-3	3
5	Ishida Y.	0	1	0	0	1	—	1	0	3-4	—
5	Kataoka S.	1	0	1	1	1	0	—	0	4-3	4
5	Yamashiro	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	—	5-2	1

Note: Players are ranked according to their results in the previous league.

18th Meijin League (1993)

Title-holder: Kobayashi Koichi

Rank	Name	O	C	Y	A	T	R	KM	M	KS	Score	Place
1	Otake	—	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	6-1	1
2	Cho Chikun	1	—	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	6-2	2
3	Yoda	0	1	—	1	0	0	1	1	0	4-4	4
4	Awaji	0	0	0	—	0	0	0	1	0	1-7	—
5	Takemiya	0	1	1	1	—	1	0	1	0	5-3	3
6	Rin Kaiho	0	0	1	1	0	—	0	1	1	4-4	5
7	Kato Masao	0	0	0	1	1	1	—	0	1	4-4	6
7	Miyazawa	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	—	0	1-7	—
7	Kataoka S.	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	—	4-4	—

Note 1: Players are ranked according to their results in the previous league.

Note 2: Kato won a playoff with Kataoka for 6th place.

The 2nd Ing Cup

Part One: A Triumph for the World's Strongest Woman Player

Apart from the dispute between the sponsors and China that arose at this year's Ing Cup (described in the news section of GW68), the biggest stir was probably caused by the new rule adopted by Ing of buying time with komi.

Actually Ing's special rules have dominated discussion of the tournament in the Japanese go press just as much this time as four years ago. Since propagating these rules is Ing's main purpose in holding the tournament, that should be the way he wants it, but the real reason seems to be that the rules came as a fresh shock to the go press. In other words, everyone in the go world here had dismissed them from their minds in the intervening years since the 1st Cup. This is hardly a good omen for Ing's ambition of making his rules the universal rules of go.

First of all, Japanese players remain quite unconvinced of the appropriateness of the 7 1/2-point komi. Kato Masao, for example, declined his invitation from Ing on this ground. 'The 7 1/2 komi is clearly favourable for White,' he said. 'As research into the fuseki advances, this will become clearer.'

The other Japanese player who declined to participate was Kobayashi Koichi. One report (quoted in GW68) said that he objected to the new time-extension rule; another said that he was too busy with the Honinbo and Gosei title matches. We have been unable to establish which is the real reason, so the reader can take his choice.

The time-extension rule referred to gives a player an automatic extension of 35 minutes when his time allowance of 3 1/2 hours is up. In return, he must give the opponent two points in komi. Three time extensions are possible, after which the player concerned loses on time.

From the Japanese point of view, fiddling around with the komi is a minor change compared to this rule, but actually it was already


part of the Ing rules when they were first formulated 18 years ago. When asked why he didn't introduce it in the 1st Cup, Ing replied: 'I wanted to use this rule in the 1st Cup, but there was so much opposition to the komi that if I had tried to introduce this rule too, the tournament itself might have been endangered. It's safer to bring in innovations one by one. In a word, the theme of the time-extension rule is "time is money".'



*Ing Chang-Ki: a man with a vision
— and the money to back it up*

Putting aside the question of the merit of this rule, it certainly added to the drama of the tournament. In the first round, Hashimoto Shoji and Chan Ka Yui, who are fellow members of the Kansai Ki-in, both took the maximum time extensions, so they were still playing hours after the other players had gone home. Though he won, Chan came within three minutes of losing the game on time.

In the pressroom someone made the comment that 'this rule seems to have been especially created for Otake'. Known for the rapidity of his play, Otake is the last player likely to need an extension of time. Playing against Chan in the second round, he ended up receiving a massive komi of 13 1/2, as Chan once again took all of his extensions. In contrast to Otake, Takemiya, who in recent years has frequently advocated shortening time limits in professional go, took two extensions against O Meien. Since he used the time to kill a big group, however, the extra komi didn't worry him. In fact, in the first three rounds no player lost because of taking a time extension.



Ishii (W) v. O Meien

One player did lose a game for a very different reason. In his game with O Meien in the first round, resigning was Ishii Kunio's losing move. In the position above, Ishii resigned after Black 1, but if he had played White 'a' through 'g' he would have won the capturing race. This is the second time Ishii has resigned a won game; the first was in the playoff to decide the Oza challenger two years ago.

Rui Naiwei's Triumph

The star of the tournament so far has been Rui Naiwei 9-dan of Shanghai. Aged 28, Rui had already established herself as the world's top woman player before she became the world's first woman 9-dan in 1988. For the last couple of years, Rui has been living in Japan,

where she has been teaching go and working in the international division of an insurance company. At first, it was thought that she came to Japan out of dissatisfaction with lack of opportunity in China, but now it appears that there may have been a political reason for her self-exile. Unfortunately, the result has been that, apart from some demonstration games, she has not had any match practice in that time. One would think that the simplest thing would be for her to join the Nihon Ki-in, but the Nihon Ki-in might not want to risk injuring its relationship with the Chinese Go Association. This is conjecture on our part, however, so perhaps we should leave the subject until we have more definite information.

In these circumstances, the Ing Cup was obviously a heaven-sent chance for Rui to prove her real worth. She rose to the occasion magnificently and in reaching the semifinals has posted what is probably the best performance yet by a woman in a board game. Two of her games follow.



Rui Naiwei

Born on 28 December 1963 in Shanghai. Became 4-dan in 1982 (the entry level to the professional ranks in China), and was promoted to 5-dan the same year. Reached 6-dan in 1984 and 7-dan in 1985, the year she turned professional. Promoted to 8-dan in 1986 and 9-dan in 1988.

Rui v. Komatsu

Judging by the applause at the opening ceremony when the pairing was announced, this was the most popular game of the first round. Actually there is a little irony involved.

Rui is good friends with Komatsu and Yoda, with whom she studies in Fujisawa Shuko's group (see GW66 for an account of one of his winter training camps). As the pairings for the 1st round proceeded, it became apparent that Rui would be matched against either Yoda or Komatsu. The distress of these two was comical to behold. Neither had expected to play in the Ing Cup until Kobayashi and Kato pulled out, and they had been encouraging Rui to do her best. 'At the least, you've got to win one game,' was their refrain. Little had they dreamed that that win would have to come at their expense. Yoda gave a cheer when he was drawn against Wu Songsheng.

Apart from friendship, Komatsu might have had another reason for not wanting to play Rui: he hadn't won any of the four games they'd played in Shuko's study group. When their game started, it was obvious that Rui was more psyched up for the tournament.

White: Rui Naiwei 9-dan (Shanghai)

Black: Komatsu Hideki 8-dan (Tokyo)

Played in Tokyo on 13 July 1992.

Commentary by Kudo Norio 9-dan.




Figure 1 (1-32)

Figure 1 (1-32)

According to the Ing rules, the winner of the *nigiri* can choose the colour he wants. In the eight first-round games, Komatsu was the only player to choose black. Despite the large komi, he preferred to rely on his favourite Chinese opening.

Rui had a surprise for Komatsu. The moves to 23 are the same as in a Meijin-league game against Rin Kaiho the previous week which Komatsu had won. In effect, Rui is saying that things won't be as easy against her as against Rin.

The first change is 24. Rin played at A.

Figure 2 (33-72)

Black's invasion at 33 is premature. Kudo: 'I'd prefer to strike at A. If Black starts a fight by cutting off a stone with White B, Black C, White D, Black E, the game would be promising for him.'

When White attacks first with 38 and builds centre thickness, the value of attacking with Black A lessens.




Figure 2 (33-72)

Black 45. Kudo: 'You could call this the losing move. The exchange for 46 strengthens the white group to the right, which in turn invites the invasion of 58.'

When White lives up to 72, she is clearly ahead.

Figure 3 (73-100) (next page)

Kudo: 'The ko threat of 93 is a *mochikomi*

(loss without compensation), but Black already seems to be half resigned. He no longer feels like trying to compete territorially; rather, he hopes to upset White's lead by starting a fight.'

Calmly reinforcing at 96 during the course of the ko fight amounts to a declaration of victory. Just living at the top will be enough for White.




Figure 3 (73-100)
ko: 83, 86, 89, 92, 95




Figure 4 (101-150)
15: connects

Figure 4 (101-150)

Black sacrifices from 17 on in the hope of pulling off something in the centre.

Up to 49, Black has built his outside thick-

ness, but will he be able to use it?




Figure 5 (151-192)

Figure 5 (151-192)

Black cuts with 57 and 59, but Rui is not worried. She counters severely with 62 and 64.

Komatsu has to resign after 92. If he connects at A, White links up with B; Black then has to live with C, White D, Black E, but he may even be behind on the board.

This was a convincing win for Rui. Komatsu's comment: 'Calling Rui the world's strongest woman player is funny. Why not simply call her the world's strongest player?'

Black resigns after White 192.

(Go Weekly, 28 July 1992)



Rui juggling Komatsu at will
(Cartoon by Ayuzawa Makoto)

Rui v. Lee

Rui's opponent in this game is the current Tongyang Securities Cup world champion, the

17-year-old prodigy Lee Changho. As he was free, Komatsu gave a commentary on the game while it was in progress.

White: Lee Changho 5-dan (Seoul)

Black: Rui Naiwei

Played in Tokyo on 15 July 1992.

Commentary by Komatsu Hideki.





Figure 1 (1-43)



Dia. 1

Figure 1 (1-43)

Komatsu: 'The moves to 27 are reasonable. I don't understand the fight after the invasion of 28 very well. If White uses 32 to jump to A, Black will be able to link up with B later. However, if she does link up, that makes White's moves forcing moves, so simply jumping to A would be the standard move.'

For 37, I'd prefer to lean on the stronger

white group with Black C and aim at attacking the centre group. When White jumps ahead of Black with 40, Black has to start worrying about the large komi.

'Black 41. Exchanging Black D for White E would be more solid. To me, D feels like the vital point for both sides. So I can't approve of 42. Threatening Black above and below with 1 in *Dia. 1* feels right. If Black 2, White moves down with 3, and Black probably won't be happy with her game. White 42 is laying waste to an area which is not likely to become black territory anyway.'




Figure 2 (44-109)

Figure 2 (44-109)

Komatsu and O Rissei agreed that the game was tough for Black when White settled his group up to 54.

Komatsu: 'When Black jumps to 55, she is aiming directly at A.'

'At around this stage, Lee probably felt that he was in the lead. He probably felt too grateful for having a komi of as much as 7 1/2 points. That feeling, I believe, made him defend at 58, but he should after all have taken aim at Black's thinness with a move like White 60 or White 68-Black B-White 60. Playing 60 after defending at 58 means that White falls one tempo behind.'

White 94 is an uncharacteristically thoughtless move for Lee. The superbly timed move of 95 is decisive: it gives White a severe jolt. The game is decided when Black cuts the corner down to size up to 105. If White uses 96 to

block at 97, Black pulls off something in the corner with A, White C, Black D.

Black 109 is a declaration of victory. 'This was probably not the way Lee planned it. He expected to pull away in the endgame, but the opposite happened. Rui is also really strong at the endgame.'




Figure 3 (110-193)

ko: 57, 60, 63, 66, 69, 72, 75

77: connects; ko: 78, 81

Figure 3 (110-193)

People were just starting to say that the game was surprisingly close when Go Seigen appeared in the pressroom. Casting one glance at the TV monitor, he surprised the professionals present by declaring, 'It's a big win for Black.' And that's the way it turned out.


Black 39-49 is a life-and-death tesuji: this really clinches the game. Black has prepared plenty of ko threats, so not even Lee Chang-ho can do anything about it.

White resigns after Black 193.

(Igo Club, September 1992)

At the tournament reception, Rui and Jiang Zhujiu announced that they had got married. Jiang, who has spent the last couple of years in California, seemed to be suffering from lack of match practice even more than Rui. Playing against Yang Jaeho 7-dan of Korea, he took an overwhelming lead in the beginning (see diagram below), but let the game slip through his fingers. Incidentally, Jiang was seeded into the second round, by virtue of beating

Takemiya in the 1st Cup, which was yet another reason why Ing could not compromise on his participation.




Jiang (B) v. Yang

In the third round, Rui took revenge for her husband by defeating Yang. The latter may not be very well known outside Korea, but he won the 1st Tongyang Securites Cup. That was before it became a large-scale international tournament, but even so there was plenty of tough opposition from within Korea.


The future for Rui and Jiang is uncertain. They hope eventually to live in the U.S., in which case Rui's winning the Ing Cup would give them a very good stake to start married life together. Unlike some other, very wealthy competitors in this tournament, she really is playing to secure her livelihood. Since she has proven how strong she is, it's a pity some way can't be found for her to compete regularly at the professional level.

(Ing report by John Power.)

Two Life-and-Death Problems



1. Black to live



2. Black to get a ko.

Answers on page 44

The 2nd Ing Cup

Part Two: Otake and Seo Prevail in the Semifinals




At the press conference before the semifinals. Seated on the left are Seo and Cho Chikun, with Otake and Rui on the far right. Ing is fourth from the right. Next to Cho is Go Seigen, who was making his first visit to Taiwan in 26 years.

Rui's run of success came to an end when she lost the semifinal 2–1 to Otake. That eliminated the world's top woman player from the only tournament in which she is allowed to compete, but at least she had the consolation of proving her worth by taking a game from Otake.

In the other semifinal, Seo Bong-soo of Korea defeated Cho Chikun 2–1 and so won his way for the first time to the final of an international tournament. (The semifinal games were played in Taipei on 23, 25, and 27 November 1992.)

The crucial game of the Cho–Seo clash was the second, in which Cho was defeated not so much by his opponent as by time. After Cho won the first game, the second saw a very close finish. In the diagram on the right, Cho played the endgame sequence from White 1 on, but lost by exactly half a point (counting by the Japanese system — it was one point by the Ing system) when Seo defended at 12.



White had more ko threats, so he could have thrown in at 12, forcing Black to connect at 'a'.

Under the Chinese system, which counts all points occupied or surrounded as territory, the result would then have been a half-point win for Cho when he switched to 10.

Cho knew this, but he was down to the last minute of his time allowance. If he had fought the ko, he would have had to take an extension, thus incurring a penalty of two points, so there was no way he could win.

Seo went on to win the best-of-five final against Otake 3-2, thus giving Korea her second victory in a row in this title. We will present some games from the final in our next issue. Here we would like to look at the Rui-Otake semifinal.

Rui v. Otake

'I've already dreamed six times of losing to Otake. Even in the dream it seems strange to me, because I know I haven't played him yet.'

These words, spoken by Rui before her departure from Japan for the Taipei semifinal, show how important this match was to her. Unlike the other participants, she had no other tournament games to distract her from the Ing Cup.

Since coming to Japan, Rui has had no trouble earning a livelihood. Apart from her job at the insurance company, she often plays teaching games at go events and festivities and is the main instructor for a computer network. Her only opportunities to play even games, however, are in private study groups, especially the ones run by Fujisawa Shuko and Rin, and occasional public demonstration games. That being the case, the Ing Cup games were her first serious games for two years, perhaps even longer.

Rui gave up all her teaching to prepare for the semifinal. In an interview, she said that her target was to take the match to three games. She succeeded in that, and as far as content goes could have had two wins with a little more luck.

Game One

White: Otake Hideo 9-dan

Black: Rui Naiwei 9-dan

Komi: 7½ points; **time:** 3½ hours each.

Played in Taipei on 23 November 1992.




Figure 1 (1-58)

Figure 1 (1-58)

Otake won the *nigiri* and chose white. He agrees with most other Japanese professionals that the *komi* of 7½ is too large.

White makes a leisurely start, relying on the large *komi*.




Figure 2 (59-100)

80: ko (at 72); 83: ko (at 77); 84: ko (at 70);
85: connects (at 72); 87: ko (at 81)

Figure 2 (59-100)

Rui starts showing her strength with 59. With 63, she plays tenaciously, and a dizzying sequence follows up to 88.

Rui keeps up the pressure with 89. Her attack seems to have scored a success when she cuts at

93. Perhaps Otake made a miscalculation: this does not fit in with his leisurely strategy at the beginning.

Be that as it may, Black also gets weak groups to worry about when White counters with 94 to 100.




Figure 3 (101-170)

Figure 3 (101-170)

One way or another, all the weak groups get settled by 46 without mishap. The endgame begins with 49; the game seems very close.




Figure 4 (171-248)

ko (over 97): 109, 112, 115, 118, 121, 124;
129: ko (right of 82); 132: ko (at 82);
135, 138: ko; 140: connects (right of 122);
141: ko (right of 82); 144: ko (at 82); 147: ko

Figure 4 (171-248)

After the game Rui commented: 'I missed a number of chances, but even so I thought the game wasn't bad for me. However, in the end-game I suddenly realized that I couldn't win.'

We don't know just which point Rui was referring to, but her loss became certain when she captured two stones in the centre at 79 instead of following up her ko threat at 77 by capturing three stones. However, even if she had played 79 at 80, the game would probably still have been bad for her.

Soon after this Rui 'bought' her first time extension.

At first sight, White seemed to be in trouble after Black 97, but Otake had already calculated the result of the fight. Rui ran out of ko threats.

Otake: 'At one stage I was close to collapse.' Perhaps he was just being diplomatic, but it does seem that for much of the game Rui believed she was ahead.

Black resigns after White 248.
(Go Weekly, 15 December 1993)



First blood to Otake

Game Two

White: Rui Naiwei

Black: Otake Hideo

Played in Taipei on 25 November 1992.

Commentary by Rui Naiwei. (This commentary was given at Rin Kaiho's home, so there are occasional interjections by him.)





Figure 1 (1-40)

Dia. 1: *tewari***Figure 1 (1-40). A good start**

Rui is fond of playing *tenuki* with 12. Perhaps this reflects the influence of Go Seigen — she has been acting as his assistant in a series of instructional videos.

Black 15. Rui expected Otake to extend to A and planned to answer with B. Rin: 'Perhaps Black didn't like the idea of White B. In the old days, letting Black play A or 26 was considered bad for White. However, if you make a *tewari* analysis, Black has, in effect, made the narrow extension to 1 in *Dia. 1*. White has then exchanged 2 for 3, which is OK, but White 4 is a bad move. That's perhaps why this was thought bad for White, but Black 1 is slow and inefficient, so the exchange is equal.'

Rui was satisfied with the fuseki to 28. Black's shape on the right side is not adequate. Even if he adds a stone at C, White can still invade at D.

Black 35. Defending at 39, letting White connect at 35, would show poor fighting spirit, especially when Black has to give such a large *komi*. Starting a fight is natural.

Rui: 'I was scolded for 40 [she did not say by whom]. White has to attack on a large scale with E, Black F, White G — because my bottom position is solid. White 40 is too small in scale.'

White 40 does capture the cutting stones, so locally it is not really bad; the question is which is superior, Black's left-side thickness or White's bottom thickness.





Figure 2 (41-70)

Dia. 2: *captured***Figure 2 (41-70). A turning point**

White 42. Rui: 'Capturing like this is no good either. Again, White should attack on a large scale with A, Black B, White C. White has a sente move at D, so Black probably won't flee with B immediately.'


Black 43. Black can't escape with 1 etc. in *Dia. 2*: White captures him with 2 to 8. If next Black 'a', White squeezes with 'b'; if Black 'b', White connects at 'a'.

White 54 is a good move, with various implications. It's superior to the ordinary one-space jump. One possible follow-up is White E, Black F, White G.


Black 63 is a major strategic turning point. Black could also attack the bottom group with 1 in *Dia. 3* (suggested by Rui's husband, Jiang). Otake prefers to aim at the invasion at 65.

White 66 is a move that will be sente any time — any time except now, that is, as Black seizes the chance to counterattack with 67. Rui regretted not simply jumping to H.

White 68 is the only move. If White follows 66 by pushing down at 1 in *Dia. 4*, Black 2 and 4 are very bad for her.



Dia. 3: Jiang's proposal



Dia. 4: bad for White




Figure 3 (71-100)


Figure 3 (71-100). The losing move

Black 73. 'I think this is the losing move,' said Rui. 'Black should connect at 1 in *Dia. 5*. White would then make the diagonal connection at 2, but there would still be bad *aji* left at the top. For example, Black can seal me in in sente with 3 to 11, which would be unbearable.'


When Black plays 73, the continuation to 81 is forced. Letting White cut through the middle of his position like this is terrible. White's weak

group on the upper right side has suddenly been transformed into a strong one. White now has just one weak group, on the bottom right, but it is not easy to find an effective way to attack it.


Black 85. Black is on the spot. If he could connect at 3 in *Dia. 6*, he would gain some compensation for his loss on the right, but after White counters with 4 and 6 he can't save both his groups. The result is that White gets a large territory at the top to add to her gain on the right.




Dia. 5: bad aji



Dia. 6: unreasonable for Black



Dia. 7



Dia. 8

White 90 threatens a placement at A.

White 92 is a clever answer to Black's counter-forcing move of 91. The aim of 91 is to make White answer at 1 in *Dia. 7*, letting Black cut at 2. If Black cuts with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 8* after 92, White breaks through with 4 and 6, after which the centre black group is in danger.

Black has no choice but to defend with 93. Likewise, 95 is forced.

White 100 is a severe move, reminding one that Rui's forte is centre fighting. Black can't attempt to save his two stones to the right.






Figure 4 (101-150)

15: connects



Dia. 9



Dia. 10

Figure 4 (101-150). Settling the shape

Black 7. Black is hoping for 1 in Dia. 9: White has no answer to 2. However, Rui is ready with the counter of 8. Black can't resist: if Black 3 in Dia. 10 (after forcing with 1), White cuts him off.

Black 17 defends against the threat of White 48; if Black 49, White A, Black 46, White B, and Black is left with two cutting points in his shape.

A complicated *furikawari* follows up to 25. White may seem to gain from this, but — 'Not really,' said Rui. 'Isn't it an even exchange in the local context? Well, in a sense, White is relieved to settle the shape.' At around this stage, Rui was apparently confident she had a win.

Figure 5 (151-200). No slips

White 52 is a safety-first move. A hane to the right of 55 would be much bigger, but Rui wants to eliminate the bad *aji* in the centre.







Figure 5 (151-200)



Dia. 11: disaster



Dia. 12: safe



Dia. 13: tricky but —
4: connects; 11: ko

Black 65 is an interesting point. If White answers at 1 in Dia. 11, she loses her group after 2 to 6. With White 66, she just barely survives. If Black now attacks with 1 and 3 in Dia. 12, she wins the capturing race with one eye to none. Instead of 1 —

Dia. 13. The throw-in at 1 is trickier, but again Rui had the counter all read out. Up to 12, she gets a double ko, so she is safe.

The last diagram explains why White 70 is necessary when Black connects at 69.

When Black resigns, he is about one point ahead on the board. Rui has a reputation for being strong at aerial fights. The surprising amount of territory she ended up with in the centre would seem to justify it.

Black resigns after White 200.

(Adapted from a commentary in *Igo*)

This game qualifies as the highest-level win ever by a woman professional. The skill displayed by Rui certainly suggests that she would be in the running to take a newspaper title (in any of the Far Eastern go-playing countries) if she were ever given a chance to compete.

Game Three

During the semifinals in Taipei, the local media made Rui the star of the tournament, and her success in the second game justified the intense coverage she received. The morning session of the third game was televised live. The lights seemed to make Rui a little nervous, but Otake was right at home.

This being the third game, the players had to *nigiri* again for colours. Otake guessed right and chose to take white. Rui is one of the few players who prefers black even with the large Ing *komi*, so presumably she was happy too.

White: Otake Hideo

Black: Rui Naiwei

Played on 27 November 1992.

Commentary by Otake, interviewed by Akiyama Kenji for Igo Club.

Figure 1 (1–41). Aiming at a fragmented fuseki

Otake: This fuseki feels a little odd to me. Rui presumably regards 7 and 9 as forcing moves, but I wouldn't *tenuki* here. I also think that the usual strategy with 21 would be to extend to 1 in *Dia. 1*, then cap at 3.

IC (*Igo Club*): White is playing an *amashi* strategy, relying on the large *komi*.

Otake: Right. The idea is that the $7\frac{1}{2}$ -point *komi* will make its weight felt if the game becomes fragmented. The *komi* just might turn into $9\frac{1}{2}$ or $11\frac{1}{2}$ [if Black takes time extensions].

IC: But the black area at the top looks big.

Otake: This is the only area that's good for Black. She can't expect to win by very much on

the board in this position. I wouldn't feel like investing two stones here with 35 and 41.





Figure 1 (1–41)



Dia. 1: the usual strategy



Rui Naiwei





Figure 2 (42-83)
ko: 50, 53, 56


Figure 2 (42-83). A resolute peep

IC: The large ko starting with 42 will be decisive. Can't Black connect at 42 instead of 55?

Otake: That's *Dia. 2*. White plays 2 to 6. White has 'a', so he should live. White won't be unhappy if he lives bang in the centre of Black's *moyo*. If possible, White would have liked to play his ko threat at 1 in *Dia. 3*, but this time Black will connect; after White 3 and 5, Black 6 puts the white group in jeopardy. Actually, the sequence in the game was what I expected. Above all else, the shape from winning the ko is fantastic.



Dia. 2: good for White



Dia. 3: risky

Otake: There are various possibilities for 67. Black could attack immediately in the centre with 83; Black 82 also looks feasible. It's difficult to say which is best. The move that surprised me the most was the peep of 79. I could never play it. I'd worry about the harmful effects on Black from letting White build this solid pillar. But Rui is the type of player who focusses more on her opponent's thinness than her own thinness. She doesn't consider 79 wasteful because it aims at Black A. Power players worry about their own thinness, so they play thickly and detonate their power later. Rui's a power player, but of a different type. I was on my guard against her power as I played.

IC: Around this point, the opinion in the pressroom favoured Black. Go Seigen and Jiang Zhujiu were rooting for her.




Figure 3 (84-120)

Figure 3 (84-120).

Otake: Black 91 also astonished me. Black is attempting to turn the whole top area into her territory just as it is. On top of that, she's aiming at the ko with Black A, White B, Black C. She's concluded that she can't win if she allows White 95, Black 94, White 91. Black 91 is a very impressive do-or-die move.


IC: Her husband Jiang predicted Black 91 [earlier he predicted she would play the ko threat of 57]. Do married couples come to think the same?

Otake: Black 95 is also fantastic. This kind of move is so frightening I wouldn't even think of it.

IC: There was a stir in the pressroom: would Otake's group fall to Rui's power?

Otake: There's no question of being captured. You just have to dispose of some of your stones. And that's the way it turned out in the game.


IC: How would White save the group is Black used 107 to play at 1 in *Dia. 4*?



Dia. 4: a strong attack

Otake: I intended to force with White 2 on, then descend at 10. Even if Black spoils my eye shape with 11, White is virtually alive after 1 to 7 in *Dia. 5*. White has the sente cut of White 'a' through 'g', so Black is the one who's in trouble.

IC: So you lived by disposing of the top right? That's clever.



Dia. 5: White won't die

Figure 4 (121–156). A momentary crisis

IC: What's the meaning of 24 on?

Otake: My bad habit of fooling around. If I had defended cautiously at White 35 or 36, the game would have been over. Actually I had overlooked one of the *dame* points. I panicked when Black smartly played a series of forcing moves, then cut with 35 to 39. I thought I'd had it.

IC: Go Seigen got up and left at this point, saying that the game was 99% won for Black. I must say it's not often one sees an Otake group get so twisted up. Rui Naiwei's power had finally exploded





Figure 4 (121–156)



Dia. 6: Black still in the game

Otake: Even so, when it comes to finding a sequence for Black to win, it's difficult. Trying to force with 53 after White linked up with 52 was the losing move. It must be at 1 in *Dia. 6*. The *kosumi* of 2 is the only move that makes shape, but the placement of 3 is severe. In the end, Black rips off the centre in sente, and White lives up to 14. Black forces with 15, then backs up with 17 and 19. White tickles Black with 20 — the game will be decided by whether or not he can take sente here. Because he's left with the option of living in the top right corner, which is large.

IC: Wait a minute. Is the large white group alive even if its connection is cut?

Otake: After White 'a' and Black 'b', White 'c',

Otake: After White 'a' and Black 'b', White 'c', 'd', and 'e' are all sente, so I have an eye here. The outcome would be unclear in this variation.




Figure 5 (157–272)

64: connects (at 61)

ko (over 95): 103, 110, 113, 116

ko (over 111): 133, 136, 147, 150, 155, 158, 161

163: connects (at 124)

Figure 5 (157–272). Fighting to the bitter end

Otake: Black forced, beginning with the peep of 57, and took sente, but the territorial loss is awful. This doesn't begin to compare with *Dia.* 6.

IC: Even if Black uses 71 to connect at 72, White has an eye around 68, so he can afford to

answer at 71. Black went all out at the bottom, but she suddenly became thin when White pushed up at 76. The players in the pressroom seemed crestfallen.

Otake: There's nothing Black can do, but Rui made fantastic efforts. There's nothing that works, but she went out fighting. When I looked at Rui near the end, she looked as if she'd burst out crying at any minute. That was too much.

The day before, the news came in that Shuko had defended the Oza title. What with Shuko still going so strong, I felt I couldn't let myself lose.

This was the first match I played with a woman. That was a little painful. There was a lot of pressure.

IC: Now for the final with Seo Bong-soo — your chance to become a world champion.

Otake: Don't make fun of me. Well, I feel I've fulfilled my responsibility by coming this far.

Rui did cry after she lost. She wasn't just upset at losing. As she said between her tears, 'There are no games waiting for me.' Even though she had shown she could match a top player like Otake on even terms, once the Ing Cup was over, there was no arena for her to demonstrate her strength in. This semifinal was everything for her, everything, perhaps, until the next Ing Cup, in four years' time. If she could play in Japanese tournaments, of course, we would be able to see more of her go . . .

Black resigns after White 272.

(Igo Club, February 1993. Translated by John Power.)



Michael Redmond's First Title Challenge



In 1992 Michael Redmond made history by becoming the first non-Oriental to play in a professional title match. The occasion was the 17th King of the New Stars (Shinjin-O), a title restricted to players aged under 30 and ranked under 8-dan, who compete for a first prize of ¥2,200,000. Unfortunately, Michael had no luck in a contest with a formidable opponent, but still his performance was worthy of note.

To mark his achievement, we would like to present three games from this tournament: the two title-match games and Michael's semifinal win.

Redmond v. Yuki

In the semifinal Michael was matched against a strong opponent. Yuki Satoshi, aged 21, is the top player of the younger generation at the Kansai Ki-in and, as the winner of the 15th title, he was one of the favourites, along with Komatsu Hideki. Moreover, he was enjoying marvellous form last year. At the time of this game, his record so far for the year was 28 wins to 3 losses, including a winning streak of 24 games earlier. Michael, on the other hand, was actually having a bad year, losses matching wins at 7-7. However, his form in the Shin-

jin-O tournament in this game was different: he played brilliantly and scored a convincing win.

White: Michael Redmond 7-dan

Black: Yuki Satoshi 7-dan

Played at the Nihon Ki-in on 9 July 1992.

Commentary by Tozawa Akinobu 9-dan.




Figure 1 (1-50)

Figure 1 (1-50). White's fuseki failure


The focus of this opening is the effectiveness of Black's *sanren-sei*. Black 19 to 25 try to make the best use of the *sanren-sei*. Locally, the shape move for 21 is 1 in *Dia. 1* (next page), but in this position Black will be dissatisfied with having White *atari* at 6. White's group stands in the way of the expansion of the right-side position.

The continuation to 36 well illustrates the contrasting styles of the two players: Yuki likes thickness, Michael profit. However, Black 39 is dubious: why seal in a white group that's already alive? Black must cut to the right of 32 to make his *sanren-sei* work.

White seizes the opportunity to go into action with 40; when he makes good shape up to 48, Black's thickness disappears. Black fails to get compensation for the profit that White took at the top: his *sanren-sei* strategy has failed.

Yuki spent an hour on 49 to 53 in Figure

2, but these moves fail to improve his position — on the contrary, they worsen it.



Dia. 1: good for White





Figure 2 (51-100)



Dia. 2: better strategy for Black

Figure 2 (51-100). Who is attacking whom?

Black 51 is in the wrong direction. The *sanren-sei* has already lost its potential for development, so emphasizing the right side like this is pointless. Dia. 2 shows one of the variations explored by the players after the

game.

Dia. 2. Attacking White with 1 to 5 helps develop a *moyo* on the left side and also give meaning to the marked stone (39).

In the game, Black links his groups with 55, a move without any substance. White gets sente to switch to 56, which makes nice balance with his stones to the right.

White 58 looks like a deep invasion, but White plans to attack Black. In response, Black should start a ko, as in Dia. 3, instead of simply jumping out to 59. He has any number of ko threats.

Black 69 and 71 reflect Yuki's fondness for building thickness, but they let White take the good point of 72. Tozawa and both the players agreed after the game that Black should have used 71 to cap at 72; if then White 86, Black caps again at A. This would be more severe.

Black was aiming at 73, but Tozawa lavishly praised Michael's answer at 74. This not only defends the corner but is also the strongest defence at the centre bottom. White 1 in Dia. 4 would be submissive; if then Black 2 as in the game, Black is left with Black A-White B-Black C in the corner.


Attacking at 83 was what Black was aiming at. Pulling out 73 immediately would just hurt the main group. Still, with his attack at 83 and the *aji* of 73, the game now looks more interesting than before for Black, but...

White calmly reinforces the bottom with 84. Black must defend at 85, so then White seeks eye space with 86.


With 87, Black finally seems to have contrived the double attack (*karami*) he was seeking, but instead of scrambling for life White launches a strong counterattack with 88. If he were to play this move at, let's say, B, Black's peep at C would be a potent threat.

In a flash — specifically, with 88 to 96 — the tables are turned and the defender becomes the attacker. Black's group is faced with a crisis.


Black 97 and 99 may look strange, but playing a ko is Black's only hope. If instead he counters at 1 in Dia. 5, he can't get two eyes. (Capturing 8 does not make an eye: White sacrifices two stones.)




Dia. 3



Dia. 4



Dia. 5: Black dies



1967), became a professional *shodan* at the same time (1981). Komatsu progressed up the *dan* ladder a little faster. In fact, he is the main rival of Yoda as the top player under 30 at the Nihon Ki-in. At the time of this game, he was a member of both the Honinbo and Meijin leagues, a double usually restricted to the very top players. (Including this 17th Shinjin-title, he has won six minor titles, which actually puts him in 24th place on the list of title winners — Yoda is 13th with 11 titles). Although this was a knockout tournament, Redmond recognized his opponent's achievements by saying that he looked upon himself as the 'challenger'.

17th Shinjin-O Title Match Game One

White: Michael Redmond 7-dan

Black: Komatsu Hideki 8-dan

Played at the Nihon Ki-in on 21 September 1992.

Komi: 5½; time: 5 hours each.

Commentary by Oya Koichi 7-dan.




Figure 1 (1-29)

Figure 1 (1-29). Michael makes the better start.

Black 17 met with a bad reception in the pressroom. After the continuation to 29, the result is that 17-29 enclose an area that is open at the side (from White 28), so 17 is

inefficient. It would be better to omit it and make the shoulder hit of 25 immediately.





Figure 2 (30-51)

Figure 2 (30-51). Reducing the *moyo* too early

White 30 is a difficult point. Michael thought for 51 minutes and invaded, because, he said, the more he thought the less he knew what to do. However, Black's continuation — 31 to 37, 39, 51 — is natural and flowing.

Instead of 30, White could also have considered A and B. The reasons: Black has to add a stone at 33 to make proper shape at the top, he's open on the side (below C). If he plays at Black 32, he does secure all the right side, but such a passive move would probably lose. In view of all these factors, reducing the *moyo* after Black has played 33 and C would be the best timing.



Dia. 1

White 32 ends up in a funny position. Pushing up with 1 in *Dia. 1* is better. White will welcome 6 at 'a': he counters with 7.

Black 39 recoups the loss Black has suffered on the right side.





Figure 3 (52-71)



Dia. 2

Figure 3 (52-71). *Both sides go wrong.*

Blocking at 53 looks natural, but it is the move Komatsu regretted most. 'I wanted to play 1 in *Dia. 2*,' he said, 'but White 2 and the clamp at 4 . . . Even so, walling off the centre with 5 on looks good. White got a good game when he cut at 60.'

However, Michael fails to follow through properly. White 66 is too thin, giving Black excellent moves at 67 and 69. The balance of power in the centre is reversed, with White's group becoming weaker than Black's. Instead, he should have moved down solidly with White 66 at 68, Black A, White 69, Black B, White C; Black will then have to extend up at D, to avoid giving White the good *atari* here, so next White could play E.




Figure 4 (72-83)

Figure 4 (72-83). *The losing move?*

White 72 is a detour. In fact, Oya calls it the losing move. Michael didn't accept this evaluation after the game, on the grounds that letting the marked white stone be captured would be too big. Oya maintained nonetheless that pushing down at White 77 was biggest. That would come very close to linking up the two white groups, in which case White could look forward to attacking the black group to the left. In his view, Black 77 severs White's lifeline.



Komatsu Hideki




Figure 5 (84-118)





Figure 6 (119-141)
31: ko; 34: ko



Dia. 3

Figure 5 (84-118). *Not what Black planned*

The forcing moves of 85 to 89 feel good; Black doesn't have to capture the white group, as he is well ahead in territory.

White 98 was the move Michael regretted most in this game. If instead he had played at 102, he would have been able to link up to the left-side group. Michael later said that 'my hand slipped'.

Black 101 may look natural, to punish White for his mistake, but actually it is risky. The safety-first policy would be to follow *Dia. 3*: linking up like this is good enough for Black.

Michael went into *byo-yomi* on 102.

No one in the pressroom saw the sacrifice of 104 and 106, which sets up the sente move of 114, coming. Komatsu himself said that he overlooked White 110.

Things look dangerous for Black when White jumps out to 118. There is only one answer to this move.

Figure 6 (119-141). *An exciting finish*

Black 19 is the correct move: anything else would be risky.

Komatsu still had plenty of time, so after White 20 he settled down and carefully analysed the position. He read out the exchange to 41 and confirmed that this gave him a win.

Instead of 36, White could play 38 — he has a ko threat at A — but he can't win this way either. (The result is roughly similar to what happens in the game, except that White captures the bottom left group on a slightly larger scale.)




Figure 7 (142-199)

Figure 7 (142–199). Good positional judgement

The moves in this figure do not affect the result. When he resigns, White is about 15 points behind on the board.

Komatsu's excellent positional judgement played a large part in his victory. When he met with an unexpected counterattack after missing the straightforward win in *Dia. 3*, he read out the fight and accurately assessed the result.

Michael fought well, but was unable to hang on to his early lead. He now faced a *kadoban*.

White resigns after Black 199.

Game Two

White: Komatsu Hideki

Black: Michael Redmond

Played at the Nihon Ki-in on 29 September 1992. *Commentary by Kojima Takaho 9-dan.*




Figure 1 (1–39)

Figure 1 (1–39). A dubious enclosure?

There are no problems up to 25, but Black 25 was queried in the pressroom and by Michael's opponent. Komatsu: 'Isn't an approach move at 28 the only move? If Black wants to enclose the corner, then should he play at A?'

Black stakes the game on his invasion at 33.

Figure 2 (40–61). A fight starts.

White tries to seal Black in with 40 and 42

instead of seeking eye space with an extension to 50. Black naturally counterattacks with 45.

White 52. The game would be over if White could press to the left of 60, but apparently this move does not work.




Figure 2 (40–61)





Figure 3 (62–87)

Figure 3 (62–87). 'Losing moves' by both

Komatsu regretted White 62: it provokes Black 69, which hurts White's eye space on the left. He called it 'the losing move', but the real losing move came with Black 73.

Instead of 62, Komatsu said he should have followed *Dia. 1* (next page). This variation may look very complicated, but the point is to sacrifice five stones to set up the

connecting move of 21. If Black captures them with 'a', White can switch to 'b' and be satisfied; if instead Black plays at 'b', resisting with White 'c' is feasible.



Dia. 1
18: connects

Instead of 73, Black should simply connect at 75 and aim at attacking the white group with Black A, White B, Black C.

Black tries to pull off something in the bottom right corner, but he has bad *aji* in the bottom left corner.





Figure 4 (88-109)

Figure 4 (88-109). Komatsu's oversight?

The placement of 88 exploits the bad *aji* of the corner, but apparently Komatsu misread the fight. Komatsu thought that if Black

used 97 to connect at 1 in Dia. 2, the result would have been a *seki*. However, the correct result is the ko in Dia. 3. Michael saw this, which is why he switched to 97 instead of connecting. He commented later that he was sure that if he had connected at 1 in Dia. 3, Komatsu would have had a proper look at it and found the ko.



Instead, a different ko fight breaks out in the bottom right corner. In response to the ko threat of 105, White plays the makeshift of 106, then finishes off the ko with 108. If next Black A, he intends to counter by fighting the ko above 93.

Black 109 aims not only at attacking the white group here but also at creating ko threats for the coming ko fight on the bottom left.




Figure 5 (110-200)
ko: 19, 22, 87, 90, 93, 96, 99

Figure 5 (110-200). The game is decided.

Black misses a chance with 19. If instead he played at A first, forcing White to answer at 26, then switched to 19, the game would still be very close.

White 20 is very big.

Extending to 32 clinches the game.

Figure 6 (201-277). Komatsu in peak form

This game was decided by Black's untimely *atari* at 73 in Figure 3. This slip made all the difference in the subsequent fighting and proved to be too much of a handicap.

Michael fought on to the bitter end, but Komatsu didn't give him any chances to get back into the game.

With this win, Komatsu joined the select group of players who have won this title twice. This feat is said to guarantee that the winner will become a top-flight competitor. Overall, he enjoyed excellent form last year, and at this point his win-loss record was 33-10 (he ended the year with 43-20, seven more wins than anyone else, and won the *Kido* prize for most wins).

Komatsu commented wryly that some of his friends had said to him that it would be better for the future of go if he lost this title match. A Westerner winning a title would certainly help popularize the game, but we will have to wait a little longer.




Figure 6 (201-277)

5: ko (below 2); 9: connects (at 2)
45: ko (at 39); 77: connects (at 42)

White wins by $4\frac{1}{2}$ points.

(Adapted from *Kido*, November 1992)



An in-form Komatsu proves too much of a barrier in Michael Redmond's first title match.

The 1st Jinro Cup

The 1st Jinro Cup: The SBS World Championship was decided by a clash between the top boards of the Korean and Japanese teams on 26 February 1993 in Seoul. The five-man Chinese team had already been eliminated (see pages 3 and 4 for full details).

In Korean tournaments, Cho Hun-hyun has been put in the shade a little by the meteoric rise of his disciple, Lee Chang-ho, but he's still a formidable competitor on the international scene, as his play in this game shows. The commentary is by Japan's non-playing team captain.

White: Cho Hun-hyun (Korea)

Black: Takemiya Masaki (Japan)

Komi: 5½; time: one hour each + one minute per move. Played on 26 February 1993.

Commentary by Ishida Yoshio 9-dan.





Figure 1 (1-50)







Figure 2 (51-100)



Dia. 4




Figure 3 (101-164)

Figure 3 (101-164). A comfortable lead

Black 3. Black can't afford to pull out his stone in *atari*: White 16 would then put him on the spot.

After the continuation to 21, White can get a *seki* or an approach-move ko. The latter would be a 'flower-viewing' ko for White (that is, he would stand to lose anything), so this result is very profitable for White. The game is decided.

White plays solidly with 22 on. He doesn't mind if Black takes a move to defend the centre with 49. Instead of 30, he could lead out all of his stones with White 32, Black A, White B, but he judges that this isn't necessary. In fact, White has so much territory on the top and bottom left that Black is not in the game.

At the end, White 62 and 64 cut off some black stones: if Black C, White D. Neglecting to defend here was Black's way of setting the scene for resignation. Even if he had defended, he might even be behind on the board.

Japanese and Chinese players seem to do badly in the international tournaments staged in Korea. Korean players also used to do badly in the international tournament staged in Japan, the Fujitsu Cup, but that changed this year.

Black resigns after White 164.

(Go Weekly, 16 March 1993)



Cho Hun-hyun

The 5th Fujitsu Cup Final

Otake's First International Success

As a quick, decisive player, Otake should be ideally suited for the short time limits of international tournaments, so it comes as a surprise to realize that he has not even come close to winning any of the ones he has participated in in the past.

This year was different. Though he turned 50 on 12 May, Otake seemed to be in peak form. He led all the way in the Meijin league, and he was playing well in the Fujitsu Cup, scoring valuable wins over China's top players, Ma Xiaochun and Nie Weiping. He also reached the finals of the Ing Cup. Just five days after the Fujitsu Cup final, he played his final game in the Meijin league and ended up two points ahead of the field. This rarely happens in a league, where playoffs are not uncommon and leads of one point are the usual margin. If he could maintain this good form, he seemed certain to give Kobayashi Meijin a good run for his money in the title match.

Nonetheless, Otake had to battle hard for his Fujitsu Cup win, as his own commentary, presented below, will show.

White: Otake Hideo 9-dan

Black: O Rissei 9-dan

Played in Tokyo on 1 August 1992.

Commentary by Otake.

Figure 1 (1-22). *Inconsistent strategy?*

The time allowance of three hours in this tournament suits me.

Since my opponent was Rissei, I of course expected the Chinese Opening.

When White plays 20 in this fuseki, he gets a thick position, since Black has taken territory in the upper left corner. That means that the expansion of Black's Chinese Opening framework is hampered, which seems a little inconsistent. Though you could say it's a sign of Black's flexibility.

Playing 9 at A would probably be the usual strategy.

White immediately slides into the corner with 22. He doesn't want to expand his moyo with B in this position. *Dia. 1* would be ideal

for White, so Black must try something different. In short, White 22 probes the opponent's response. He is saying to the opponent: if you do the wrong thing, the stones at 2, 6, and 8 will shine.





Figure 1 (1-22)



Dia. 1

Fujitsu Cup Prize Money

1st: ¥15,000,000

2nd: ¥7,000,000

3rd: ¥4,000,000

4th: ¥2,000,000

Fujitsu Cup Winners

1 (1988). Takemiya Masaki (defeated Rin)

2 (1989). Takemiya (d. Rin)

3 (1990). Rin Kaiho (d. Nie Weiping)

4 (1991). Cho Chikun (Qian Yuping forfeited)

5 (1992). Otake Hideo (d. O Rissei)





Figure 2 (23-43)



Dia. 2

Figure 2 (23-43). *Early lead to White*

Rissei set his stone in motion with 23. Up to 29 he switches back and forth from the top to the centre. For White 30, A is also good shape, but the follow-up at B is small, so I played 30.

After these moves at the top, Black expands his moyo with 31. This looks like a change in plans. It's hard for Black to move out with his three stones up to 27, and if he can't move out it would be better not to have played them. Consequently, this fuseki is a little more interesting for White than for Black.

I just took a guess with the reducing move of 32, but it looks pretty reasonable to me. If Black answers at 1 in *Dia. 2*, then perhaps White plays 2 and 4. Or perhaps he jumps to

'a'. I would have thought about it when 1 was played.

Rissei throws in a slight twist with 33, then in response to the probe of 34 goes all-out with 35. This leaves White with the option of living in the corner. Usually you should play Black C. It was obvious that Black would answer 36 at 37, so as I played it I thought that 36 might be a bit of an overplay.





Figure 3 (44-71)

56, 59, 62: ko



Dia. 3

Figure 3 (44-71). *An unusually stupid move*

At this point I played a truly awful move.

White pushes along at 44, letting Black occupy the vital point of 45. White must make Black link up by playing at 44. I can only wonder how I could have been such an idiot.

Dia. 3. White must jump to 1. Letting Black cut with 2 and 4 hurts, but White sacrifices the two stones and aims at squeezing. An alternative is to play 1 at 'a'; that leads to a difficult fight after Black 'b', White 'c', Black 'd'.

White 46 and 48 show that I was still upset

by my mistake. I lost my temper and played without reading ahead. Playing a shoulder hit at 57 instead of 46 would have been more leisurely.

If Black plays 49 at 51, White gets a good result with White 53; if instead Black 53, White plays 51.

However, White doesn't have a move when Black answers at 49. I didn't see this good move coming.

I had no choice but to try to make the best of it with the ko after 50, but Black automatically solidifies his territory. This feels like a loss of about ten points.

Normally White 64 would also be a strange move.

Black 65 to 71 make miai of an approach move on the bottom left and playing at A. Black is completely controlling the flow of the game; a loss for White looks inevitable.





Figure 4 (72-100)



Dia. 4

Dia. 5

Figure 4 (72-100). Black leads.

White goes for substance with 72: he is telling Black to do what he likes at the top. Black

puts his plan into effect with 73.

Compromising with 80 is unavoidable. If White 1 in Dia. 4, Black gets a ko.

White 82. The opinion might well be expressed that White should at least capture with 1 in Dia. 5, but the way the game has developed White no longer feels like doing this. White 82 is also the fighting move.

Black 85 is thick in various ways. White expands with 86 and 88 and waits for Black's invasion. At the time I felt that the game was really bad for me, but around here it seems to be quite close. The gap is not so great because the fuseki was good for White.




Figure 5 (101-134)

Figure 5 (101-134). O Rissei misses his chance.

The way Black lives at the bottom seems reasonable, but if he can have Black play 5 to 11, White is not dissatisfied locally. He is also left with the good-aji move of A.


And with his sente White switches to securing life in the bottom right corner. At this stage, this is biggest.

However, I did not take enough pains over the way I lived. Since I just followed the standard pattern with 12 and 14, Black strengthened his outside wall with 15, making it impossible for White to omit 16. Thanks to his stone at 15, Black can swagger through the centre with 19 and 21 and play 27 in sente. Black 27 and 29 secure a territory of about 15 points.

This clearly makes the game a loss for White.

Dia. 6. Instead of making the hane and connection, White must simply play at 1. The reason is that the value of Black 'd' is greater than that of White 'a'—Black 'b'—White 'c'. If Black lets White live by playing 'c-a', there's a big improvement on the game, while the ko of 'e' would be frightening for Black as well as for White.

If after 34 Rissei had played at B, he would probably have become the world champion. But he was misreading the position and thought that he had to play all-out.



Dia. 6




Figure 6 (135-169)

Figure 6 (135-169). Plunged into confusion


That's why Black attached at 35. The game was now thrown into confusion.

White might have had a clever move around 56, but I couldn't see it.

Also, instead of 58, perhaps I should have had the boldness to play at 1 in *Dia. 7*. White 'a'—Black 'b'—White 'c' is sente in the corner, so White can get a ko even if Black attaches at 2. If I had thought that my position was definitely bad, I would probably have opted for this variation.

However, I believed that after the overplay of 35 the gap had narrowed. Making Black play 61 is a gain in itself, and with 64 White captures the two stones. So I thought that I was very unlikely to lose.

Neither Rissei nor I was able to calculate the score precisely.



Dia. 7





Figure 7 (170-200)



Dia. 8

Figure 7 (170–200). *Very close*

White 78 is premature. White doesn't gain a thing in the endgame sequence to 89. White has to play 1 in *Dia. 8* first. That sets up the tesuji of 5.




Figure 8 (201–246)

4: ko; 10: connects;
ko: 24, 27, 30, 33, 36, 39, 42

Figure 8 (201–246). *The losing move*

Rissei's losing move was the ko capture of 17. When I was able to play 18, I believed that

though the game was close I had upset his lead. If Black had played 17 at A, White B, Black C, Black would have won.

This was a bad game for me; in particular, I have regrets about my careless move of 44 and my self-indulgent reading with 46 and 48 [Figure 3]. Not seeing the answer of 49 is ridiculous.

White wins by 1/2 point.

(Kido, October 1992)





Figure 9 (247–281)

80: connects (under 72); 81: connects (above 79)

Two Life-and-Death Problems: Answers

Answer to Problem 1

Dia. 1. Black 1 is the only way to live. If White 2, Black connects at 3. Thanks to the marked stone, he is sure of a second eye.



Go in the Snow

by Peter Shotwell

Yesterday: Everything we know of the people, ideas and events of early Tibet lies in a confusion of ruins, records and remembrances that have been preserved, altered, or lost for many reasons. What we do now is impose various concepts on them, but the results are only shadows of what it was like then.

Today: There are seductive ideas of going to Tibet and finding in the Himalayas a lost monastery, a Shangri-la, where high Buddhist lamas, with all the accumulated wisdom of past lives, place go stones on the boards, while they monitor the slow turnings of the Great Wheel of Time. Of course, these are illusions.

The study of go in Tibet is in a preliminary stage. It is preliminary because much more is unknown than known. Those who have studied it have not been anthropologists, historians (or Tibetans), and those who have studied Tibet have not known a great deal about go. Both have missed much.

Further investigation will be a difficult task. Tibet is enormous. The speaking area covers the modern territory plus large parts of Qinghai, Gansu and Szechuan Provinces in China, and extends into Nepal, Bhutan, Mustang, and Sikkim in Northern India. Most future research will need to be done in the countryside where travel is not allowed. Even if it were, much of Tibet is a desolate wasteland that is over 12,000 feet. The climate is hostile most of the year, there is little food, the water is polluted, and there is little mechanized transportation outside the few main roads. A simple trip of 100 km. can take a week. There are often no telephones or clocks, so interviews and meetings can be very difficult to arrange. Knowledge of Tibetan is imperative, but there are many dialects. As in many poor countries, using a lot of money to solve these problems can be counterproductive.

On the other hand, while the spirit of the culture remains, the content is disappearing rapidly. Tibetan go will die with the older men of this generation.¹

What Is Known

The first article on go in Tibet was written in 1982 by Cheng Xiao Liu, 6-dan, and now the editor of a Chinese weiqi magazine. Mr. Cheng proposed that the Chinese brought go

to Tibet in the 7th century, and that stories about Tibetans playing go before this were made up later. There is a possibility that, writing when he did, it may have been impolitic to say otherwise. This article was discussed by Yasunaga Hajime in the Japanese *Go Magazine*, by myself in the *American Go Journal* and, more extensively, by John Fairbairn in *Go World*.

This year, an article, *Symbolism of Black and White in Tibet*, was written by Yian Zhen Zhong in Chinese for the magazine *Tibetan Culture*. Mr. Yian, a founder of the Tibetan Strange Occurrences Society, considerably enlarges Cheng's efforts with many new stories and records. While not entirely focusing on go, nor following the conclusions out, he develops the idea that there was a parallel development of Tibetan and Chinese *weiqi*, and that early tales of *weiqi* playing in Tibet were accurate. His reasoning will be examined, but first some background is necessary.

Before its partial unification in the mid-7th century, most of the Tibetan area was a patchwork of small warring kingdoms. The religion was Bon (or Bon-po). Strictly speaking, Bon means only 'priest' — not 'religion' — and refers to individual 'shamans'. To them, as one researcher phrased it, 'The phenomenal condition is not a self-existent structure but is dependent on other states of being. He who knows how may work things to his will for good or evil.'² Outwardly, they differ from the Buddhists because their 'swastika' is reversed, they walk counter-clockwise around sacred places, and they chiefly worship their Persian founder, yShen-rab. During that same critical period of 600–700 A.D., the Buddhists began to arrive in force from India, eventually convert-

ing most of the population. They invented an alphabet and writing appeared for the first time. The religion that developed, however, absorbed many of the Bon beliefs and what resulted was very different from its Indian origins or the Chinese style. Oracles and astrology were used, and one could reach Nirvana in one lifetime. The Bon meanwhile developed into three types: the White (often indistinguishable from the Buddhists), the Striped (a mixture of older practices, often confused with the original Buddhist sect of 'the old ones'), and the Black (the old, pure form). By the 1100s, in defense and in imitation of the Buddhists, many had organized into monasteries and had begun to write down sutras and records.

The first serious contacts between the Chinese and Tibetans also began in the seventh century, although 'contacts' is perhaps a euphemism — a Chinese princess, whose equipage included a go set, was given as tribute to the Tibetan King and, later, the Tibetans sacked the Tang Dynasty capital of Chang An.

The kingdom collapsed in 842, and the next phase, which has lasted until today, brought the famous alliances and fights between the Buddhist lamas and, first, the Mongols (conquerors of China by 1200), and later the Chinese. 'Dalai' Lama is a Mongolian word, and most Mongolians are (or were) Tibetan Buddhists.

From very early on, the Buddhists (whose monks formed about a quarter of the population) were prohibited from playing *weiqi*, while it formed a definite part of the Bon tradition. It continued to be played by the aristocracy until the collapse of the old order, being one of the 'Nine Activities' of the accomplished gentleman.

Folk Records and Remembrances

1) On Mt. Bunburi, 'three days east of Lhasa', an early Indian Buddhist priest came over the mountains to this (still) Bon area. The local Bon-po challenged the interloper and the two agreed to a debate over doctrine. Speaking different languages, they couldn't understand each other, so they decided to play *weiqi* but the Bon won. Mr. Yian thinks this indi-

cates that it was a traditional Bon game, there being no history of go in India. (The Buddhist won the final contest by hopping on the first beam of morning sunlight and beating his rival in a race to the mountaintop.)

2) There are many kinds of spirits in Tibet. *Khadomas* — *Dakinis* in Sanskrit — are very common. Female teachers of secret doctrines, they are either not of this world or exceptional people who have been re-incarnated as women. They have red or green eyes. The leader of one group has the head of a lion and the body of a woman. On Mt. Zari, in southern Tibet, is a natural stone board where she played go with her cohorts. Once every twelve years, in Monkey Year, the locals offer devotions, and walk around the stone in Bon fashion, hoping to gain favors and wisdom. The old ones recall hearing stories about the *Khadomas* playing go in the storms and wind with the black and white clouds of the skies. Always, the good *Khadomas* would win.

3) A Bon researcher told me that in Ghalrong, the village he had grown up in (north of Lhasa), he had played Tibetan *weiqi* as a child. He said the local (Bon) priests know about *weiqi* but play another kind of game with go sets, where black and white line up on the sides and jump over each other. Perhaps this is *bKagom bu Chos*, which a high lama once told me he had played in his youth. They use it both for divination and for recreation.

4) In Tome, near Shigatze, where 'The King of *Weiqi*' once ruled (see below), I showed some villagers a game diagram and fear went across their faces. They didn't want to talk about it, saying it was 'Black Bon' and 'this is what they used to tell you things like how long you would live.'

5) Cheng and Yian both describe a carved stone board in Qinghai where King Gesar's wife (and presumably Gesar) and the military staff played *weiqi*. Subject of the longest folk-poem in the world, he was a leader of one of the smaller districts after the breakup of the Tibetan Kingdom. (His name probably comes from the Byzantine use of the word 'Caesar'). There is doubt as to whether he was Buddhist or Bon, or even Tibetan or Mongolian, and a special department is studying him at the University of Tibet.

Here there are also local stories about *weiqi*,

the spirits and the Bon.

Literary References:

1) Yian relates from a Bon document that, sometime before the Buddhists came, a certain boy's father had been killed by an enemy. His son grew up feeling the stirrings of revenge, but was it 'time'? Would he be able to kill his adversary? His mother gave him a *weiqi* set and with one hand taking white and the other black, he played a game with himself. The game was close but finally, with help of some power mantras from his mother, white, 'his side' — the 'good side' — won. This indicated it was a good time for the enterprise, which, it turned out, it was.

2) Cheng mentions a very early record that the Buddha played 'excellent' *weiqi*. However, this was not translated into Tibetan until after 700. Yian of course thinks that it was faked by the Buddhists, indicating their jealousy at not being able to play well.

3) In the Bon monastery of Tome, all of the monks once avidly played *weiqi*, and there 'The King of *Weiqi*' reigned. This must have been sometime after 1100, when Bon monasteries were first organized. I tried to visit but was arrested by unsympathetic police, it being too near a notorious prison. What little I did see (the bottom part — the main buildings are on top of a small hill) was pretty 'White' (as all the Bon monasteries seem to be now), and locals do not know of any go being played by the monks there. Still, it would have been interesting to talk to some of the older monks, if there are any left. (There was a 20-year dispersal and only a very partial repopulating of a few Tibetan monasteries following the Cultural Revolution.)

4) In Turfan and Dunhuang, which interface Tibet, China and Mongolia along the old Silk Route, various Tang Dynasty go objects have turned up. These include the oldest go painting (on a silk manuscript, now in London), various full-size stones and miniature go sets (see below), and official Chinese reports on the Tibetans' fondness of playing dice and *weiqi*. Yian points out that these would have mentioned Chinese origins, if that had been the case. Other records indicate that there was a great deal of study of the game then and that

there were even books of strategy, but these references may be to Chinese *weiqi* since the *Dunhuang Xieben Qijing*, a tactics book from the Sui Dynasty, was also discovered there.

5) There are persistent stories among old Tibetan *weiqi* players that the game originally came from Mongolia (where only the terminology is different — see below). Yian thinks this is because in c. 1200 two high-ranking Tibetans visiting Khublai Khan asked for and received the expensive gift of a go set. He doesn't discuss the idea of a common ancient origin of Chinese and Tibetan *weiqi* in Shaminist Siberia (from where it would have crossed into Mongolia first).

6) In the late 1600's, as discussed in Fairbairn's article, three games may have been played between a Tibetan Yellow Hat Lama and a Mongolian general. It is not recorded in the histories, and they may have not been playing for the hegemony since it was only later that the Tibetan was killed. If the story was true, it might have added fuel to the eventually victorious Yellow Hats' (and Buddhists') general condemnation of go playing but more through fear of losing to outsiders than as an 'omen' as Fairbairn reports. This will be discussed in more detail later.

7) Stored at La Brong Monastery in Gansu Province there is (or was) a 16-page 19th century manuscript on go by Dempa Diazo, a famous player and astrologer. By then, the Yellow Hats not only looked down upon go but had also made playing it illegal. Problems with the government also prevented me from seeing it, but Yian thinks it was probably burned in the Cultural Revolution.

These are all the known written records, and it is quite possible that nothing else will be found. All but four of the 2500 monasteries in Tibet, along with most of their contents, were destroyed in the Cultural Revolution, thus obliterating whatever had survived the persecutions of the Buddhists, who, even if they couldn't suppress the playing of the game among the aristocracy, at least prevented its theoretical development. The only new thing we are likely to find are oral records.

The Rules

Yian argues that part of the evidence that


Tibetan go did not originate in China lies in the completely different terminology and, especially, in the famous killing rule. You must wait one move before killing any one-eyed group. Perhaps this element of mercy is a later Buddhist innovation, since it is hard to imagine the Bon being overly concerned. They used *weiqi* board divination to 'destroy bad things' in general, and cast spells and distributed poison to accomplish it in reality.

My informants added to Yian's list many other rules, customs and names that may seem strange to us, but whether these apply outside the Llahsa area, only further research can tell. For example, the tongue-fights between players which Yian contrasts with the 'hand-talk' and 'pure conversation' of c. 7th century Chinese *weiqi* were never heard of in Sikkimese go circles.³ Even the 'name' of Tibetan go, 'Mi Mang', which means 'many eyes', referring to the board (though it may have originally meant 'many stones') refers to *weiqi* only in the Llahsa area. Outside, it can also refer to another jumping kind of game, already mentioned, that is also played on the go board. Nowadays, the term 'Zang Qi' (from 'Xi Zang' — 'Tibet') is unequivocally used, but this is a Chinese word.

Care is of course called for in determining which game is being referred to, especially in the oral records.

In the beginning of a game, the board is automatically partitioned into areas of influence by twelve large black and white stones called 'Bo', which means something like 'scarecrows' or 'protectors (of your fields)'.

The center is 'Kong' — 'empty' or 'belonging to everyone', and the center point is often marked with a vajra (the Buddhist 'symbol' of sudden enlightenment). The smaller stones are called 'Diu' — 'small, tough rocks' or actually anything small and tough. The total of all the stones on a side is 301 even though the traditional 17x17 (cloth) boards (I saw one 15x15) have only 289 intersections.⁴ Note that $289 + 12 = 301$ (White has 151). The 12 starting stones also have significance in the Bon system. The year has 12 months: the (square) city of Olmolungring — equivalent to the Buddhist Shambala or Shangri-la — has 12 palaces, and so the board becomes a miniature spatial temporal cosmos.



Diagram


The difference in stone size provides additional evidence for the separation of Chinese and Tibetan go. In a very incomplete set of full size stones (about 20 in all) that I saw in the Dunhuang Museum, two of the black ones were exceptionally large and the rest were tiny, all in the Tibetan tradition. On the other hand, the stones of a game-in-progress on a miniature funeral board, (now housed in the Delhi Museum), also from Tang-era Dunhuang, are, like all the Han Dynasty 'tomb stones', of the same size.

Like Chinese stones, one side is flat, the other round. In the old Sikkimese set that I saw, some of the white stones were like moon-stones but most of them seemed to be of the beautiful white kinged-marble that Fairbairn discusses. Perhaps some had been lost. The black ones (either marble or glass) show an eerie green translucence when held up to the light. One sees this same exquisite combination today in good Chinese sets from Yunnan.

Players choose for black and white by rolling the stones in a way reminiscent of the Taoist method of talking with the spirits. Certain combinations of flat- and round-side up mean various things. White (the 'good' color, but not necessarily the best player) goes first and receives 1/2 a point for his efforts (i.e. White wins a tie). Handicaps are given in points and not extra stones. Bo's, if captured, count only as one point each.

Play always begins at the corners, and you must play within one intersection of a pre-

vious play or Bo (!). The center intersection is worth five points, and if you lose your two corners (the 1-1 points) and the opponent keeps his, there is a 20-point penalty (!!). With this in mind, see what you think of the game that Fairbairn dismissed as being of a low standard of play.



only Liu Po, a dice game even the gods played. Was this early legend reflecting the idea that man could attempt to see into the future on his own — that he was in control of his 'destiny', so to speak?⁷ Second, in pre-Muslim tradition there is the story of an Indian king who invented *nard*, a dice game, to show that nothing is gained through cleverness and skill. This was too one-sided, so chess was invented to suggest that success goes to the prudent while misfortune befalls the ignorant. Later, Muslim theologians encouraged *nard*, because the player left himself in the hands of God, while they largely prohibited chess because the players were trying to outwit God regarding their fates on the board. Third, in certain areas of Christianity the opposite was true — monks could play chess because God gave man rationality which should be used; to play dice was to invite the Devil (in the form of Chance) into your life.

The Bon, however, had no God, and in our sense of the word, probably no gods. Underlying their whole system was an Iranian-style dualism. There has always been a war between Black and White, Good and Evil, which neither side will ever win. At any given moment in time there is a certain balance that permeates the universe. The Great Wheel of Time reflects this idea and the 'final' victory, when the Good Kings ride out of Olmolungring, is only the beginning of another turning. The knowledgeable person in Bon is able to calculate this balance.

In the story about the boy playing himself, who was taking black? It was not Death, or the Devil, or, as in Huxley's trope, the 'unseen opponent' (of yourself). Nor was he looking for an 'omen' or 'fortune-telling' in our sense of the word. It was the condition of the universe that he was seeking to find. God was not outside of him. In the same way a shaman is 'being danced' by the powers above, the stones are playing him. It doesn't matter if he was playing a game of chance or skill — he could have played dice just as well. But this was not Muslim-style fatalism — his future had not already been decided. It was all simply another part of the fluctuating totality of the whole system. Under these circumstances of a 'continuous present', a black win would have indicated that it was an evil period — black

being the color of death and evil deeds, of the wild, untamed Yaks, the underworld, the shade and shadows, the night, etc. The win by white showed it to be a good time. White is the dawn, the top of mountains, the light, the stars, the moon, the tame Yaks (crossed with cows), and the color of the stone that people put on the tops of their houses. The 'logic' behind the events of the 17th century thus becomes more understandable. The victory of the Mongolian in go was only a 'sign' of the generally bad times — it was not an 'omen', and it didn't make playing go 'unlucky' as Fairbairn thought. The actual 'winning' and 'losing' of games becomes meaningless in this system — they are just more turnings of the Great Wheel of Time. As Pharcis (who are Persian dualists now living in India) have told me, 'one does the best one can.'

It can be seen how this attitude might be offensive to a Buddhist frame of mind. In its pure state at least, Buddhism is anti-dualist, a 'salvationist' type of religion. You can win. The Bon feeling is that you can find out if you can win. This may be the underlying reason why the Buddhists opposed go play — there were no oracles used in Indian Buddhism — and the fact that their enemies played it was even more reason. The more down-to-earth aristocracy had no such objections — although they wouldn't play on the '15th of the 4th month', as Fairbairn states, since this was a Buddhist holiday.⁸ They played because the game was interesting, and it was boring to be always thinking about one's salvation, because they could gamble at it (the fourth oldest Chinese 'Go Quote' condemns this aspect of ancient Chinese go), because it had status since the lower classes didn't (have the time to) play it and, most important, because it fit into their traditional sense of symbolism. Already mentioned are the darkness and lightness of the space and the landscape of Tibet. There was also the whiteness of bones in the darkness of their bodies and, in the most important of the Tibetan origin legends, the first people were colored black and white.

Footnotes

1) I was extremely fortunate to find Sonom Chogyal of the Tibetan Academy of Social

Sciences, who helped translate and provided theoretical background on Bon. (The conclusions about go, games and Bon are my own, however). Through him, I met the (once) royal family of Sikkim whose hospitality and interest in their culture are justifiably famous. Mr Yian was also extremely helpful in elucidating some obscure points. A number of other people were also very generous with their time and energy: Zang Jian and Cheng Xiao Liu of the Chinese Weiqi Association, De Je Bai Ma and her grandfather, and Bon specialist Don Drob Lha Ghal.

2) See the works of D. L. Snellgrove. To disentangle Bon from early folk religion is beyond the scope of this article.

3) Tongue fighting is an old tradition in most of Tibet, it is just that go-tongue fighting is not found everywhere. Yian gives some interesting examples of go-tongue fighting he collected:

'This is a mouse — it will destroy your house'

'This is a cat — it will kill the mouse'

'This is a rabbit — it will eat holes everywhere underneath you'

'This is an eagle — it will capture the rabbit'

'This is a leopard and powerful'

'This is a tiger — it has the same power'

There is a wonderful (non-go) tongue fight quoted in *A Cultural History of Tibet* by Richardson and Snellgrove (Oxford, 1980) between a Chinese and a Tibetan over how a mountain goes about breaking an egg.

4) Contrast this with the rather placid yin-yang sign that often adorned old Chinese *weiqi* boards. Sometimes, flowers would be sewn onto the cloth Tibetan boards in the same manner that one of the old Han stone boards had persimmon flowers drawn in its corners. These old Han boards (which were made only for use in the next world) also had different sizes. One was 18x21. The earliest Chinese stones were rough and square, only later were they rounded off. They have been pictured in various official Chinese archaeological magazines over the years.

5) There is anthropomorphism in Chinese and Japanese go, too. The Chinese started with two 'home' stones each. The traditional Japanese custom of playing in the corner first, as several high-level players have commented, has no really valid mathematical reasoning behind it.

6) The 'unfilial son' aspects would seem to be a later Confucian overlay (a 'reverse-euhemerization').


7) See *The Rules of the Game* by Manfred Eigen (Harper & Row 1983), a Nobel Prize winner, who discusses the idea that 'play' in the form of probability is something that permeates all the 'action' (excuse the pun) of the universe, from molecules to galaxies.

8) The Sikkimese family told me stories of their fathers playing go with Muslim traders from the Turfan area. The Muslims were not allowed to gamble, but there would always be 'presents' exchanged when they left. Incidentally, the game the Prince of Sikkim played with Iyomoto, illustrated in Fairbairn, seems to have been played with mixed rules, possibly out of politeness to the Japanese.

The Myriad Shapes of Go

by Sato Masaharu 9-dan


All About Nakade




This is not a problem, but a well-known trick often employed by go gamblers in the past.

In a handicap game, White plays his first move at 1. Most people are astonished and some of them lose their composure. What about you? How would you handle it?

Dia. 1. Trying to kill the white stone with 1 is natural. White plays what look like suicide moves with 2 and 4. Of course, his group is dead. Then he attaches at 6.



Dia. 1: suicide



Dia. 2: forcing moves


Dia. 2. Black is not going to give up the stones he has just captured, so naturally he answers White's forcing moves up to 7. White then switches elsewhere with 8.

Dia. 3. Let's assume that during the course of the game White surrounds Black at a distance, as here, for example (though this is an extreme case).


Dia. 4. Finally awakened to the danger, Black may attach at 1 to make eye shape, but it is too late. White 2 creates a *nakade* shape, that is, it reduces Black to one large eye and so kills him.

The idea is to make Black relax and catch

him napping later on. The course of events here may seem improbable, but quite a few players have been caught out when their attention was distracted by fights in other parts of the board. You might like to try this trick out yourself on an unsuspecting opponent.




Dia. 3: surrounded




Dia. 4: nakade

This example is a little frivolous, but it illustrates a serious theme, that of *nakade*. This is one of the life-and-death techniques that amateurs have most trouble with, partly because a lot of reading is involved in a large *nakade*. We hope that some practice with the problems below will help you get on top of this technique.

Problem 1. A basic problem to begin with. How can Black get the *nakade* shape? If Black A, White lives with B.



1. Black to play




2. Black to play

Problem 2. This is a slightly altered version of a problem composed by Takagi 9-dan. How can Black kill White? Ko is not enough.


Problem 3. Now we're getting onto a more difficult level. The problem is to use the squeeze in the proper way to kill White.

Problem 4. This problem may make you dizzy. If you look at it carefully, you should be

able to find a way to kill White, but make sure you look at his best counters.




3. Black to play



4. Black to play

Answers on page 58.



5. Black to play

Dia. 5. Here the problem is to stop White from getting a *nakade*. You have to deal with White's threats of linking up with A and of making eyes in the corner.

A Taste for Thickness

Kudo Norio 9-dan

When you can grasp the merits of a thick move intuitively, then you can call yourself a real go player. Thick moves are moves that store up strength with a view to future potential; their effectiveness may not be immediately apparent, but if you experiment with them, with some help from us, you may find yourself acquiring a taste for thickness.


In this six-part series, the first two parts of which are published in this issue, we demonstrate in concrete terms the effectiveness of playing thick moves by looking at some basic patterns that often appear in actual play.

1. Step back to defend


Pattern One: The diagonal move

Dia. 1. This position often comes up in the attach-and-block (*tsuke-osae*) joseki. White could invade immediately at 'a', but in order to reinforce his own position he often makes the thick move of 1.


Dia. 2. If White is preoccupied with destroying black territory, he will be tempted to jump in at 1. However, Black pushes down at 2, which means that a future black move at 'a' will pose a threat to White's group. In contrast to Dia. 1, we can see that this is a *thin* way of playing. Note that Black can also play 4 at 'b'.




Dia. 1: a thick move



Dia. 2: thin



Dia. 3: the proper move




Dia. 4: greedy


Dia. 3. In answer to White 1, defending at 2 is the proper move or *honte*. The *honte* may look inefficient, but the reverse is the truth.

Dia. 4. The temptation here is to block at 1, as it seems to secure more territory in the corner. In most cases, however, this will cause you to lose points.

Dia. 5. The reason is that it leaves White the *aji* of the peep at 1. If White can crawl at 3 and live, Black suffers a major loss. Even in cases where 3 is unreasonable, the peep of 1 can give White a foothold for destroying territory with moves such as 'a' and 'b'. If Black 2 at 3, White 'c'. When you consider these factors, you can see that 1 in *Dia. 4* is a fake move.




Dia. 5: aji for White




Dia. 6: think first

Dia. 6. This is another joseki pattern. When White turns at 1, Black is likely to block at 'a' without thinking twice, but he should take a closer look.

Dia. 7. If Black blocks at 1, White will without fail slide to 2. However, White can later take aim at the whole black group by attacking with White 'a'—Black 'b'—White 'c'. The peep of 'a' serves to make Black heavy.



Dia. 7: sente but...




Dia. 8: proper move


Dia. 8. In general, Black 1 is the thicker move. This way White may switch elsewhere, but if he does slide to 'a', a later move at 'b' will not be felt by Black as a threat.

Pattern 2: The one-space jump

Dia. 1. If White turns at 1 before Black has solidified his territorial moyo, dropping back to 2 builds thickness.




Dia. 1: thick




Dia. 2: the clamp

Dia. 2. If Black is greedy and blocks at 1, he leaves White with moves such as the clamp of 2 and the peep of 'a' as footholds for destroying his territory. If Black answers White 2 at 'a', then clearly it is better to play 2 in *Dia. 1* at the outset.


Dia. 3. If Black's position is already virtually secure territory, then naturally he should block at 2. Of course, in this case White will jump in at 2 instead of turning at 1.



Dia. 3: correct



Dia. 4: proper move



Dia. 5: future trouble

Dia. 4. In this shape too White 2 is the proper move.


Dia. 5. White 1 not only creates the cutting point of 'a' but also gives Black other points such as 'b' and 'c' to aim at. White is just storing up trouble for the future.

Pattern 3: Block or cut?


Dia. 1. If Black wants to add a move in this position, blocking at 1 is a thick move.

Why doesn't Black cut at 'a'? That seems to secure profit by capturing a white stone.


Dia. 2. The reason is that if Black cuts, *aji* of various kinds is created in the marked stone. Let's look at some examples.



Dia. 1: proper move



Dia. 2: aji




Dia. 3: sente


Dia. 3. The simplest example is the sente move of 1. If Black 'a', White makes thickness with 'b'; even if White doesn't answer Black 'a', 1-'a' is a forcing exchange for him.

Another good strategy for White is to play the sente sequence of White 'c', Black 'd', White 'e'.

Dia. 4. Jumping to 1 is another way of making use of the marked stone. Later White can seal Black in neatly with White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c'.



Dia. 4: alternative



Dia. 5: a tough choice

Dia. 5. If Black has the marked stone in place, then he will have trouble deciding between 'a' and 'b'. However, I believe that most professionals would still block at 'a'. The cut of


'b' leaves White with too much *aji* to play around with.

2. Beware of defects


There are some shapes that on the surface appear to be thick but have concealed defects. Let's look at some examples of how to make real thickness, free from defects.

Pattern 4: Protecting cutting points

Dia. 1. The joseki from 1 is often seen in handicap games. How should Black play after White jumps to 11?




Dia. 1: handicap joseki




Dia. 2: thick

Dia. 2. The aim is to defend the cutting point of 'a'. Even if Black can capture White 'a' in a ladder with 'b', he should reinforce with 1 and 3. This gives Black flawless shape and enables him to utilize his thickness in the area above. Even if White pulls back at 'c' instead of 2, Black should still make thickness by extending at 3.

Dia. 3. What happens if Black does nothing? One possibility is that White will play a ladder block somewhere on the top left of the board so that he can cut at 2. Another is for White to attack with 1 and 3, turning the black group into an inefficient string of stones. Rather than thickness, this group has now become a heavy burden on Black and is vulnerable to attack. White is running rampant. One move can make a big difference.



Dia. 3: heavy




Dia. 4: next move?


Pattern 5: Taking control of troublesome stones

Dia. 4. When Black makes the pincer of 1, White often invades at the 3-3 point, leading to the joseki to 10. After this, Black can switch elsewhere, but if he adds a stone, what is the move?

Dia. 5. Taking a firm grip on the solitary white stone with the hane of 1 makes Black thick. The side area here becomes almost certain territory, and Black can also aim at attacking at 'a'.



Dia. 5: thick




Dia. 6: a fight


Dia. 6. If Black does nothing, he can hardly assume that this area is his territory. White will probably aim at moving out at 1 at an early stage. In this case, a fight follows when Black pushes along with 2 and 4. Presumably Black will only omit 1 in Dia. 5 when he can face this fight with confidence.

Dia. 7. The knight's move of 1 will probably be sente, but when White answers solidly at 2, Black finds himself left with a flawed shape. White has plenty of scope to jump to 'a' or to destroy his territory with 'b'.

Dia. 8. When the pincer (the marked stone) is one line closer, starting a fight with 'a' will not be so advantageous for White, so Black 'b' will not be urgent. If the pincer were at 'c', defending with Black 'b' would be very slack.



Dia. 7: bad aji




Dia. 8: not urgent


Pattern 6: Forestalling the hane

Dia. 9. The joseki here is often seen when White has made a double pincer. When Black has the marked stone in place, he must not neglect to seal White in by blocking at 9.

Black's thickness seems to be free of defects, but it is not perfect, as White can aim at playing the *hanedashi* of 'a'.




Dia. 9: joseki



Dia. 10: the peep


Dia. 10. Black has a good follow-up — the peep of 1 and the reinforcement of 3 — which he should play at the right time. This combination makes nice thickness and should be a part of your repertoire. Thanks to 1 —




Dia. 11: zero points

Dia. 11. Black can later harass White with 1 to 5. White just barely lives with 6. Moreover,

Black can get a sente seki with Black 'a' through White 'd', so White gets zero points. That's too painful, so after the previous diagram —



Dia. 12: advisable




Dia. 13: not good enough

Dia. 12. White will probably want to defend at 1.


Dia. 13. To go back to the beginning, it should now be clear that simply blocking at 1 has to be penalized. White can make good shape by defending at 2.

Pattern 7: How to reinforce




Dia. 14: joseki

Dia. 14. The moves to 7 are a joseki. In this position, the white hane at 'a' is an even more immediate threat than in Pattern 6, so a reinforcement is urgent. However, Black has more than one move.



Dia. 15: the proper move

Dia. 15. The thickest move is Black 1. You could call it the proper move. I recommend it particularly in handicap games. The only thing is that in even games there's a fine line between the proper move and a slack move. In some cases, Black 1 might be too slow.




Dia. 16: developing rapidly

Dia. 16. When White has a stone on the bottom left star point, Black often makes the high approach move of 1 and indirectly restrains White from attacking at 'a'. Black 1 is a move that emphasizes rapid development. If a fight develops with White 'a', Black 'b', White 'c', Black 'd', the presence of 1 means that Black doesn't have to worry about his bottom group.


A third possibility is for Black to go all-out for territory by blocking at 'e' instead of 1. If the same fight follows White 'a', it's now the right-side group that is secure enough for Black not to worry about it.

(Kido, July and August 1992.)

Continued from page 64



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

Dia. 3. Connecting at 2 is about the best that White can do, though this lets Black live with 3.

Dia. 4. Black 1 is too heavy.


(From a supplement to Kido, October 1992.)

The Myriad Shapes of Go: Answers


Continued from page 53

Answer to Problem 1

Dia. 1. Black 1 is a tesuji. White is helpless: he has no move. Black 'a' next produces a *nakade* shape, so White is dead. Please confirm this for yourself.




Dia. 1: the tesuji




Dia. 2: wrong

Dia. 2. You have to resist the temptation to connect at 1: White gets a seki with 2. Black can't play at either 'a' or 'b'.

Dia. 3. I adapted this problem from a life-and-death problem by Takagi Shoichi 9-dan. This is the original problem. What happens when Black plays first?




Dia. 3: Black to play




Dia. 4: wrong

Dia. 4. If Black links up with 1, White gets life with an *oi-otoshi* after 2 and 4.

Dia. 5. Black 1 is the correct move.



Dia. 5: correct



Dia. 6: dead

Dia. 6. If White 2, Black answers at 3, and White can't enter at 'a' because of shortage of liberties. White's blocking at 'a' gives Problem 1 above.


This is an outstanding composition by Takagi: brilliant but compact.

Answer to Problem 2


Dia. 1. The late Serizawa Hirofumi 8-dan, a shogi player who was very fond of go and quite strong, sometimes used to lament, 'If only I understood the logic of *nakade*, I'd be two stones stronger.'

One key to understanding *nakade* is to distinguish carefully between it and *seki*. This problem, another variation on a Takagi composition, provides some good practice.

Black 1 just gives White the throw-in tesuji of 2. After 4, a ko in which an *oi-otoshi* is involved follows. Black can do better.




Dia. 1: wrong




Dia. 2: wrong

Dia. 2. The atari of Black 1 also leads to a ko.

Dia. 3. The next move most people will look at is Black 1. This looks like the vital point, but White 2 creates a seki. Be sure to imprint this shape upon your mind.



Dia. 3: seki



Dia. 4: correct


Dia. 4. If Black descends first at 1, White 2 is forced. Black 3 then kills White: next Black 'a' will make the *gomoku-nakade* (five-stone big eye) shape.

Answer to Problem 3


Dia. 1. Black 1 is the vital point for creating a *nakade* shape.

Dia. 2. If either White 2 or 'a', Black squeezes and makes the *nakade* shape.


Dia. 3. Let's confirm that the group is dead. In this shape, White will have to play at 'a', so this is clearly the *gomoku-nakade* shape.




Dia. 1: vital point



*Dia. 2: nakade
6: connects*




Dia. 3: dead




*Dia. 4: wrong
6: connects*

Dia. 4. Connecting at 1 lets White live with 2. Black can't get a *nakade* shape.


Dia. 5. White might try throwing in at 2. After the moves to 8 —



*Dia. 5: variation
8: connects*



Dia. 6: dead




Dia. 7: alive

Dia. 6. Black connects at 1. Even if White captures at 'a', this is a six-stone *nakade* shape: Black plays in at 1, stopping White from getting two eyes.


Dia. 7. If Black starts with 1, White lives with 2 and 4.

Answer to Problem 4

Dia. 1. If Black plays 1, White gets a *seki* with 2. Because he has a snapback, White will get a stone at 'a', ensuring the *seki*.




Dia. 1: failure




Dia. 2: correct start

Dia. 2. Black 1 is the correct starting move, but White 4 is a good answer to 3.

Dia. 3. Black has no choice but to capture at 5. White will then atari at 6.




Dia. 3: forced




Dia. 4: the result?

Dia. 4. This shape is the result. It is an *oiotoshi*, that is, even if Black connects, he's still in atari. It might seem as if White has saved his group, and in a game many players might give up at this stage.

Dia. 5. Black sacrifices everything with 1. After 2 —




Dia. 5: sacrifice




Dia. 6: dead

Dia. 6. The placement of 1 kills the group. The point of 'a' will become a false eye (note that White can't connect there).



Answer to Problem 5

Dia. 1. The problem here is to stop White from getting a *nakade*. First, what if Black plays 1 to stop White from linking up? White counters by making one eye with 2 and 4. After Black 5, Black will continue by capturing at 'a' and White will recapture a stone. Next —



Dia. 1

Dia. 2


Dia. 2. After 2, Black will eventually have to capture White with 'a' and 'b'.

Dia. 3. Whereupon White plays in at 1, clearly creating a *nakade*. Black is dead.

Dia. 4. Starting with the cut of 1 is correct. The surprising sacrifice of a stone next with 3 is then a clever tesuji. This is the vital point. Next —


Dia. 5. Black must play 1 to stop White from getting a second eye. That seems to let

White link up with 2 and 4, but Black has another surprise for him. When he ataris at 5, White can't link up, nor can he do so after 7, so Black makes two eyes. This is the only way to stop White from getting a *nakade*.



Dia. 3: dead

Dia. 4: correct



Dia. 5: alive

Dia. 6: wrong

Dia. 6. Black 1 is a mistake: White lives after

4.


(Igo Club, May 1991)

Spot the Tesuji


Improve Your Knowledge of Shape

by Kosugi Kiyoshi 8-dan

Some of the following problems are quite easy, some not so easy. However, they all involve standard shapes and standard techniques, so you should be able to spot the tesuji at a glance. If you can't, then practising with these problems should help you develop your intuitive grasp of tesuji.




Problem 1. Exploit White's shortage of liberties in the corner.




Problem 2. Find the vital point.

If in most cases you can spot the tesuji on sight (picking the key move is enough: you can read the solution out at your leisure), then you certainly have the feel for the game of a dan player, even if your ranking hasn't yet caught up.


Black to play in all problems.




Problem 3. What is the vital point?




Problem 4. Make shape by playing at the vital point.




Problem 5. Black has a good counter to the peep.




Problem 6. Can you capture the marked stones?




Problem 7. Be careful how you handle the the marked stone.




Problem 8. How should Black deal with the marked stone?



Problem 9. Three enclosure problems. First, what is the weak point of the large-knight corner enclosure?



Problem 10. What is the weak point of this enclosure? The answer may surprise you.



Problem 11. Yes, there is a weak point in White's shape. All three black stones play a role in the solution.


Answers on page 62.

Spot the Tesuji: Answers


Answer to Problem 1

Dia. 1. Cutting at 3 is the tesuji: White is helpless to resist.


Dia. 2. If White cuts at 4, Black sacrifices.




Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3




Dia. 4

Answer to Problem 3


Dia. 1. Black 1 should leap to the eye. White has no good answer.

Dia. 2. If White intercepts with 2, Black cuts with 3 and 5 and captures the corner stones.




Dia. 3


12: connects



Dia. 4



Dia. 1



Dia. 2


Dia. 3. Black then squeezes. The whole group dies after 13.

Dia. 4. Painful though it be, White will have to give way with 2 and 4.


Answer to Problem 2

Dia. 1. The placement of 1 is the vital point.

Dia. 2. If White 2, Black gouges out his territory with 3 and 5. White still doesn't have eye shape.




Dia. 1




Dia. 2

Dia. 3. If White blocks at 2, Black captures the corner stones after 3.

Dia. 4. If White compromises with 2, he can secure eye shape, but at the cost of giving Black a lot of profit.



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

Dia. 3. If White 2, he doesn't have enough room to make two eyes after 3.

Dia. 4. Black 1 is an overplay. White just captures it.


Answer to Problem 4

Dia. 1. From White's point of view, Black 1 is an irritating peep at the vital point. If White 2, Black 3 works very well as a blockade.

Dia. 2. If White later hanes at 1, Black will be happy to sacrifice the stone with 2 and 4. White still has to add a move; he's just helped Black to build a wall, in White's gote. This peep is a standard shape move you should all know.


Dia. 3. Simply blocking at 1 is slack: White

makes good shape with 2, while Black's top area remains open.



Dia. 1

Dia. 2




Dia. 3


Answer to Problem 5

Dia. 1. The peep of 1 is another standard technique all players should know. It defends the cutting point in sente.


Dia. 2. If White 2, Black 3 is sente.




Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3



Dia. 4


Dia. 3. If instead White 2 here, Black again secures his connection in sente.

Dia. 4. Black 1 shows a lack of ingenuity. Black takes gote. If Black 1 at 2, White 1.


Answer to Problem 6

Dia. 1. Black peeps at 1 as a probe. If White 2, the tesuji of 3 ensures that he captures two stones. Black 1 at 3 gives more or less the same result.


Dia. 2. If White tries to save his two stones by connecting at 2, he looks like losing everything after 3 and 5.



Dia. 1



Dia. 2




Dia. 3

Dia. 3. In this case Black 1 is the wrong tesuji. White lives with 2 and 4 and loses nothing.


Answer to Problem 7

Dia. 1. The odd-looking move of 1 is the tesuji. If White 2, Black blocks at 3, and now White can't do anything: 'a' and 'b' are miai for Black.


Dia. 2. If White 2, Black just pulls back at 3.



Dia. 1



Dia. 2




Dia. 3

Dia. 3. Black 1 is what White wanted. With 2 and 4, he cuts off a stone. If instead Black 3 at 'a', White plays 'b' and cuts off the other stone.

Answer to Problem 8


Dia. 1. This is a problem that requires a bit of reading if you are to have the courage to play the first two moves of 1 and 3.

Dia. 2. Black 5 is a good follow-up. White has no choice but to capture a stone. He can't break through to the right, and, since he has no eyes, he will have to flee into the centre.



Dia. 1

Dia. 2




Dia. 3

Dia. 3. Black 1 takes all the pressure off White.

Answer to Problem 9


Dia. 1. Black 1 is the vital point for making utmost use of the strength of the marked stone.

Dia. 2. If White 2, Black links up with 3 and 5 and is satisfied.




Dia. 1

Dia. 2



Dia. 3



Dia. 4


Dia. 3. White might counter with the clamp of 2, in which case Black throws in a cut at 5.

Dia. 4. Black 7 sets up an interesting move at 9. White can't stop Black from breaking through on the right side. Please look at the continuations yourself.

Answer to Problem 10


Dia. 1. Different shapes call for different measures. Black attaches at the head of White's formation with 1.

Dia. 2. If White 2 and 4, Black cuts off a stone with 5 and 7 and is very satisfied.




Dia. 1

Dia. 2



Dia. 3



Dia. 4


Dia. 3. If instead White 4 here, Black lives in the corner.

Dia. 4. The placement of 1 leads nowhere after White 2. If Black 'a', White 'b', and Black is too heavy.

Answer to Problem 11

Dia. 1. In this shape the vital point is 1.

Dia. 2. White 2 is unreasonable: Black easily breaks through with 3 and 5.



Dia. 1

Dia. 2


Continued on page 57.

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
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White to play, Black dies. Find the solution on page 100 of volume 1.



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